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The Law of Unintended Consequences: The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
Interoperability
Jacqueline Lipton*

Abstract
The DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct (DMCA) has been criticizedfor many
reasons,including its impact on thefair use defense to copyrightinfringement,
and its potential to chill the free exchange of scientific, technical, and
educational information. Law professors and special interest groups have
opposed elements of the DMCA from its inception and continue to lobby for
reform. One of the more recent concerns about the DMCA involves the
incorporationof copyrightablesoftware code into tangiblegoodsforpurposes
related to the functionality of those goods. Some manufacturers of such
products recently have attempted to use the DMCA to prevent commercial
competitorsfrom developing andmarketing interoperablereplacementparts in
competition with them in relevant after-markets. Despite recent judicial
determinations against such manufacturers, the potential for future
manufacturersto arguefor the applicationofthe DMCA in these kinds ofcases
remains a matter of some concern as an unintended consequence of the
legislation. This Article advocates the development and implementation of a
legislative "carve out" to the DMCA in cases involving interoperable
replacementpartsfor tangible goods where copyrightable software code is
incorporatedincidentally into either the original good or the authorized
replacementpart orboth. DMCA liabilityshould not arisein situationswhere
copyright infringement is not a centralcommercial concern of the plaintiff.
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Since they were enacted.. . , the 'anti-circumvention' provisions of the
[DMCA] have not been used as Congress envisioned. Congress meant to
stop copyright pirates from defeating anti-piracy protections added to
copyrighted works .... In practice, the anti-circumvention provisions have
been used to stifle a wide array of legitimate activities, rather than to stop
copyright piracy. As a result, the DMCA has developed into a serious
threat to several important public policy priorities.'

1. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unintended Consequences: Five Years Under the
DMCA, 1, at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/unintended-consequences.pdf (Sept. 24, 2003).
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L Introduction
Imagine that you buy a television set, and after a few years, you lose the
remote control. You need to replace it, and you find that you have a choice of
buying an expensive new control from the manufacturer of the original
television or a cheaper "universal" control from a competitor. Presumably, you
select the cheaper control.
But what if you buy the cheaper control and then get a letter from the
television manufacturer that says you have been involved in a contributory
infringement of its copyright in some channel-tuning software? This software
is installed in the original manufacturer's remote control unit and has been
duplicated in the cheaper universal version. The letter directs you to return the
universal control to its manufacturer and to purchase a replacement at a higher
cost from the original television manufacturer. You also have been accused of
contributory involvement in trafficking of a device-the cheaper universal
control-intended to circumvent encryption software that controls access to the
copyrighted tuning software. Is such an allegation likely to happen? Probably
not, but what if you never get the initial choice between the cheaper universal
control and the more expensive replacement from the original manufacturer
because the company that had been marketing the cheaper control has been put
out of business by the television manufacturer on the grounds that the cheaper
universal control was infringing the anti-trafficking provisions 2 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)?3
If this does not sound like the work of the copyright act to you, think
again. At least two recent cases have run arguments like this-one involving
laser printer toner cartridges 4 and one involving electronic garage door
openers. To date, the argument has been unsuccessful in each case, despite its6
initial success at the district court level in the printer toner cartridge litigation.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2000) (listing infringement violations).
3. Id. §§ 1201-1205. The competing control device may also have been infringing
software copyright of the original television manufacturer. See infra Part IV.A (discussing
copyright infringement). I note that I am making the standard colloquial use of the term
"DMCA" as referring only to the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the
statute and the associated defenses found in Chapter 12 of Title 17 of the United States Code.
4. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943,96671 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (awarding a preliminary injunction to a laser printer toner cartridge
manufacturer that argued that the replacement cartridge manufacturer's product violated the
DMCA), rev'd, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
5. See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203-04 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (dismissing a garage door opener manufacturing plaintiff's claim of a DMCA
violation against the manufacturer of the universal garage door openers).
6. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 529 (vacating the district court's preliminary injunction).
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Nonetheless, the troubling issue is not the outcome of these specific cases.
Rather, it is the potential for the DMCA to be used to quash commercial
competition in contexts such as these, where a copyright work-usually
software code incorporated into a replacement product such as a toner cartridge
or garage door opener-is a purely incidental facet of the product in question.
Despite recent judicial determinations against manufacturers of toner cartridges
and garage door openers running such arguments, the current legislative and
judicial framework leaves a number of avenues open for these arguments to
resurface in the future with the potential for success.
In passing the DMCA, Congress intended to protect copyright holders
against digital piracy in copyright works.7 Congress did not intend to impact
significantly the usual rules and policies relating to commercial competition in
tangible goods. These rules and policies generally are provided by contract,
supplemented by legislation and case law dealing with commercial
transactions, 8 and also regulated to a significant extent by antitrust laws.
This Article argues for the development of a legislative "presumption" 9
against DMCA liability that covers situations where a complainant is
attempting to utilize the anti-circumvention 1° or anti-trafficking provisions," or
both, against a commercial competitor in relation to the manufacture and
distribution of competing physical goods that incorporate copyrightable
software code incidentally. Such an exception is necessary to ensure that future
applications of the DMCA do not adversely impact the rules and policies
underlying general commercial competition in markets for tangible goods. The
issues covered in this Article ultimately may have broader implications for
future reform of the DMCA.

7. See Dan I. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1135 (2003)
(stating that legislative aims behind the drafting of the DMCA were to prevent "piracy" in
digital works); see Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that "Congress
meant to stop copyright pirates").
8. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-102 (2000) (noting that this Article applies to transactions in
goods).
9. Throughout this Article, the term "presumption" is used somewhat colloquially to
indicate a state of affairs where a complainant is required to establish a legitimate concern about
copyright piracy to the satisfaction of the court in order to proceed with the action and to shift
the burden to the defendant to raise defenses to the claim. The term is not used in a strict,
technical sense.
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (prohibiting circumvention of an access control
measure).
11. See id. § 1201(a)(2) (prohibiting trafficking ofproducts that circumvent access control
technologies); id. § 1201(b) (prohibiting trafficking of additional products that circumvent copy
control technologies).
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However, in the short term, Congress should establish clear legislative
rules to ensure that cases really about the appropriate balance of competing
commercial interests in the face of potentially illegal tying arrangements are
decided on the basis of relevant antitrust principles and policies, and not on the
basis of copyright principles.' 2 This is particularly important where protection
of a copyright work against digital piracy is not a central commercial concern of
the complainant. A rule that keeps such disputes squarely within the
boundaries of antitrust analysis would prevent costly attempts to distort
copyright law and policy in directions that it was never intended to extend.
It is important that the DMCA does not become a tool for those engaging
in potentially questionable tying practices to distract attention from their
possible antitrust violations by claiming copyright and DMCA infringements
against a commercial competitor. 13 Such parties may have other valid claims
against their competitors, such as inducement of breach of licensing terms
imposed on consumers of their products, but these complaints are not a matter
for copyright law and policy. Furthermore, defenses to these claims should not
be shrouded in comparatively poorly understood doctrines such as the copyright
misuse doctrine, 14 but instead should be argued clearly as a matter of applicable
commercial and antitrust law and policy. In particular, counterclaims in
antitrust law may be more easily pleaded and adjudicated than copyright misuse
defenses that raise similar policy issues, but arguably in more oblique and
uncertain ways. 5
12. Illegal "tying" arrangements are agreements in which a seller, with significant market
power, conditions the availability of one product on the purchaser's agreement also to purchase
a second unwanted product for which there is an identifiable, distinct product market. See
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992) (holding that a tying
arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the
buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product"); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984) (holding that the question of tying turns on whether "there is a possibility
that the economic effect of the arrangement is... that petitioners have foreclosed competition
on the merits in a product market distinct from the market for the tying item").
13. Not all restrictive commercial contracts of this kind will be illegal tying arrangements.
The point here is that commercial parties should not be entitled to use the DMCA as a sword to
put a commercial competitor on the defensive in cases that are not really about the protection of
copyright interests.
14. See Brett Frishmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of
CopyrightMisuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
865, 930-31 (2000) (considering the basis of the common law copyright misuse doctrine and
attempting to provide a unified theory of the doctrine).
15. In any event, it is not clear that a copyright misuse defense would apply to a DMCA
infringement claim. This debate is taken up in more detail later in this Article. See infra Part
IV.D (considering whether a copyright misuse claim might validly be raised as a defense in a
DMCA infringement action); see also Burk, supra note 7, at 1132-40 (arguing for a new "anticircumvention misuse" defense to DMCA infringements to bring the copyright misuse policies
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An important underlying concern here, brought into sharp relief by the
recent appeal in the Lexmark International,Inc. v. Static ControlComponents,
Inc. litigation, is the question of who should bear the initial burden of proof in
these situations. 16 A copyright or DMCA analysis would suggest that the
commercial competitor should shoulder the burden of establishing
noninfringement of copyright law generally, and of the DMCA in particular, as
well as raising applicable defenses. This may include costly and timeconsuming attempts to establish the noncopyrightability of the relevant
software code even in situations where the code is only incidental to the dispute
at hand. This Article suggests that, at the very least, Congress should amend
the DMCA to incorporate a rule that places the burden of proof on the
complainant-manufacturer to establish that the prevention of copyright piracy is
indeed a central commercial concern in its complaint.' 7 The burden would shift
to the defendant only in cases where the complainant
convinces a court of its
18
legitimate concern with copyright piracy.
Part II examines the relevant provisions of the DMCA and their intended
operation and also surveys the ways in which they have been applied in recent
cases involving interoperable physical goods. Part III proposes an exception to
the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions for situations
involving interoperable physical goods. This Part calls for a legislative
presumption against DMCA liability in those situations that would operate on
the basis of a rule distinguishing between disputes involving physical goods
that incidentally incorporate copyrighted software and those whose subject
matter is the protection of a digital copyright work.
To some extent, this suggestion draws from ideas underlying the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA).19 This statute incorporates
into the realm of DMCA claims).
16. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir.
2004) (discussing the burden of proof in DMCA claims).
17. See id. at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Judge Merritt notes:
[W]e should be wary of shifting the burden to a rival manufacturer to demonstrate
that its conduct falls under [one of the statutory exceptions to DMCA liability]....
A monopolist could enforce its will against a smaller rival simply because the
potential cost of extended litigation and discovery where the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant is itself a deterrent to innovation and competition.
Id.
18. See id. at 552-53 (Merritt, J., concurring) (implying that it is open to the court to read
the DMCA to require plaintiffs to shoulder the burden of establishing the defendant's purpose to
pirate a copyrighted work). This view, however, does not represent the majority opinion, and it
is not clear that it is indeed open to the court to impose such a rule-hence the argument in this
Article for a legislative amendment in this direction.
19. UCITA is discussed as a model for an exception to the DMCA in this Article.
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provisions that distinguish computer information transactions from transactions
that incidentally involve computer information. 20 The proposed presumption
would operate by placing the burden of proof on the complainant to establish
that the protection of a copyright work against piracy is a central commercial
concern in the dispute. Thereafter, the burden would shift to the defendant to
raise any applicable defenses.
Part IV situates this discussion in a broader context and considers the
place of the above suggestion within copyright law more generally with
particular reference to the relationship between the DMCA's anticircumvention and anti-trafficking provisions and copyright's fair use, first sale,
and copyright misuse doctrines. Part V offers conclusions on these issues and
summarizes some ideas for future law reform of the DMCA.
II. The DMCA and Interoperability
A. The Anti-Circumvention and Anti-Trafficking Provisions of the DMCA
1. The Scheme of the Legislation
Congress incorporated the DMCA into the copyright act in 1998, and the
DMCA came into operation in October 2000. The DMCA deals with a number
of issues relating to copyright management in the digital age. The sections
most relevant to the present discussion are the anti-trafficking provisions found
in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b). These provisions prohibit the
manufacture, import, offering to the public, providing, or otherwise trafficking
in devices that can circumvent technological protection measures designed to
restrict access to, or use of, a copyright work.2 ' The prohibitions have their
main application to devices that are designed primarily to circumvent

However, it should be noted that UCITA itself met with limited success as a statute for reasons
unconnected with what is under discussion in this Article. UCITA garnered little support and
has been enacted only in two jurisdictions to date-Maryland and Virginia. For the current
legislative status of UCITA, see UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE...
UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited Dec. 28, 2004) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
20. See, e.g., Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act (UCITA) § 102 cmt. 7 (2002),
availableat http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.pdf (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). This Article discusses UCITA in detail in Part III.B.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2000).
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technological protection measures 22 and to devices that have only limited
commercially significant purposes other than to circumvent such measures. 23
The DMCA also prohibits acts of anti-circumvention per se; that is, it
contains a prohibition on circumventing a technological protection measure that
effectively controls access to a copyright work.24 This more basic prohibition
does have some application to the issues considered in this Article. When a
business complains about a competitor trafficking in a product that has limited
or no commercial purpose other than to circumvent a technological protection
measure, it may be the case that the competitor also has engaged in associated
acts of circumvention or has encouraged consumers to engage in circumvention
activities by providing the means for them to do so, or both. The main aim of
the original business, however, likely will be to prevent trade in the relevant
competing product.2 5
There are few real exceptions to the operation of the prohibitions on
trafficking and circumvention contained in the DMCA. The legislation states
that Congress did not intend for the DMCA to adversely impact existing
26
limitations on copyright infringement and defenses to copyright infringement,
the scope of contributory liability for copyright infringement, 27 or rights of free
speech in relation to copyright works.28
However, there clearly is an impact, particularly when courts hold that the
fair use defense cannot be asserted in an anti-circumvention proceeding
because fair use only protects certain uses of a copyright work, as opposed to
access of a copyright work without authority.29 In fact, several recent bills have
22. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A), (b)(1)(A).
23. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)(B).
24. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
25. For a recent discussion of the relationship between anti-circumvention and antitrafficking provisions in the DMCA and how they may affect the way businesses construct
technological protection measures to maximize their legal protections, see generally R. Anthony
Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of AntiCircumvention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619 (2003).

26. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000) (stating that "[n]othing in this section affects rights,
remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement").
27. Id. § 1201(c)(2) (stating that "[n]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish...
contributory liability for copyright infringement").
28. Id. § 1201(c)(4) (stating that "[n]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any
rights of free speech").
29. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that fair use is not a defense to DMCA infringement), afjfd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001); Burk, supra note 7, at 1137-38 (stating that the DMCA makes no explicit provision
for fair use with regard to the anti-circumvention right itself, as distinct from the copyright in
the underlying work); Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualProperty in the DigitalEconomy: Why
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been introduced into Congress to remedy the perceived defects of the
DMCA in terms of its impact on the fair use defense.3 ° Interestingly, some
of the judges in each of the two recent decisions in Lexmark International,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.31 and ChamberlainGroup, Inc. v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc.32 suggest a greater role for the fair use defense,
even in the DMCA context.3 3 This reasoning, however, may not stand in
the future, particularly in the face of prior precedent suggesting that the fair
use defense does not apply in access situations. These earlier precedents
were distinguished in the more recent cases rather than being overruled.3 4
Thus, there is still confusion as to the fate of the fair use defense in DMCA
proceedings.
The DMCA also includes some specific defenses for nonprofit
36
35
libraries,35 law enforcement,
intelligence, and other government agencies,
reverse engineering (interoperability), 3 ' and encryption research.3 8 Since
the inception of the legislation, these exceptions have, for the most part,
had limited application, 39 to the extent that they have been judicially
the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 539
n. 108 (1999) (stating that "[a]n extremely narrowinterpretation of the provision might suggest
that fair use could be raised as a defense to an infringement claim").
30. See generally Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.
Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations (BALANCE)
Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. For an explanation of the ways the fair use defense could
be preserved by legislative amendment in the wake of the DMCA, see Reese, supra note 24, at
663-64.
31. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
32. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
33. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 562 (Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(suggesting that the ability to raise a fair use defense to a copyright infringement claim raised in
the same proceedings as a DMCA claim would remove the potential for DMCA liability because
the successful establishment of fair use would mean that there would be "no right of a copyright
owner" protected under § 1201(b) to support an infringement claim under the section);
Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202 (specifically referring to the need to protect fair use under
§ 1201(c)(1) when faced with a DMCA infringement claim).
34. See, e.g., Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1198-99 (distinguishing UniversalStudios).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (2000) (providing a defense for libraries that "gain[] access to a
commercially exploited copyright work solely in order to make a good faith determination of
whether to acquire a copy of that work").
36. Id. § 120 1(e) (providing a defense for "lawfully authorized investigative, protective,
information security, or intelligence activity").
37. Id. § 1201(f)(1) (providing a defense for use for "the sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve interoperability").
38. Id. § 1201(g) (providing a defense for activities that "are conducted to advance the
state of knowledge in the field of encryption technology").
39. See Yochai Benkler, Free as theAirto Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraints
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tested. 4° The recent court of appeals decision in Lexmark suggests that the
reverse engineering defense might have more of a role to play in the future than
previously was thought. 4' The comments to this effect, however, are dicta
because the Sixth Circuit, having already held that the DMCA action likely was
unsupportable on the facts at hand, did not have to decide the question of the
applicability of the reverse engineering defense. In any event, the majority of
the Sixth Circuit limited their comments on the reverse engineering defense to
the preliminary injunction standard of review, accepting that their views may
not govern the findings on the defense at the permanent injunction stage. 42
2. The DMCA and InteroperableReplacement Parts
The situations under consideration in this Article involve the use of
technological protection measures in the context of commercially linking an
after-market replacement part to a product sold in commerce.4 3 The
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 417-21 (1999) (describing the
various exemptions and their limited uses); David V. Lampman H, Comment, "A Prologueto a
Farceor a Tragedy"? A Paradox,a PotentialClash: DigitalPirates,the DigitalMillennium
Copyright Act, the First Amendment & Fair Use, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 367, 393-94 (2002)
(describing the exemption as too narrow to be effective); see also Joseph P Liu, The DMCA and
the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501,524-25 (2003) (describing
the "hurdles" that one must overcome to make use of the encryption defense as limiting its use).
40. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943,
970-71 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (stating that the reverse engineering exemption to the DMCA's anticircumvention and anti-trafficking provisions is not a broad exception that would excuse any
behavior that makes a device interoperable with another device and explaining that a defendant
cannot avail itself of the exemption if its conduct constitutes copyright infringement), vacated
by 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). But see Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-42 (6th Cir. 2004) (overturning much of the district court's reasoning).
41. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550 (holding that the defendant may benefit from the
interoperability defense, particularly at the preliminary injunction stage of the proceedings).
42. Id. at 550-51. The court of appeals in Chamberlainmade similar comments about the
reverse engineering defense under § 1201(0, which are technically dicta because the court
found no DMCA infringement on the facts. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc.,
381 F.3d 1178, 1200-04 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
43. I have here avoided the use of the term "tying" in the strict antitrust sense of the term.
Illegal "tying" arrangements are agreements in which a seller with significant market power
conditions the availability of one product on the purchaser's agreement also to purchase a second
unwanted product for which there is an identifiable, distinct product market. See Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984) (considering "whether petitioners are selling two
separate products that may be tied together, and, if so, whether they have used their market power
to force their patients to accept the tying arrangement"). Many of these arrangements will amount
to tying in this sense, although some may not offend antitrust law. See Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,464 (1992) (stating that "appreciable economic power in
the tying market" is a "necessary feature of an illegal tying arrangement").
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technological protection measures will generally be in the form of software
code (TPM code). These measures can serve to encrypt other software code
(interoperability code) that ties a replacement part, such as a toner cartridge, to
an original good, such as a printer, into which the cartridge is inserted. This
interoperability code probably will have some functionality that allows the
replacement product to work effectively within the original good. In the case of
the printer toner cartridge, the interoperability code likely will create messages
between the cartridge and the printer that enable the printer to recognize the
cartridge as authorized by the printer manufacturer to operate within the
printer. 44 The same mechanism could be, and increasingly is, utilized in other
after-market replacement part industries, such as automotive parts, television
and stereo remote controls, and, of course, garage door openers.
In other words, manufacturers in many industries now can achieve through
technological means a form of tying that previously might only have been
achieved-and probably not as effectively-through contract terms.
Regardless of whether the tying conduct in question is achieved via technology,
contract, or a combination of both, and whether it comprises permissible versus
illegal constraints on subsequent uses of a product, these situations are not
within the ambit of traditional copyright law and policy, particularly where the
products in question only incidentally incorporate software code. The concern
arises because (1) copyright law generally, and the DMCA specifically, deals
with the protection of copyright works against unauthorized accesses and uses
and (2) software code is copyrightable as a "literary work. '45 Where the
interoperability code is a literary work46 and is protected against unauthorized
44. Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 952 (noting that Lexmark's digital authentication
measure prevents the unauthorized access to its Printer Engine Program and Toner Loading
Program), vacated by 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). Interoperability code, as defined here, may
well reside in two different physical items. In the printer toner cartridge example, aspects of the
interoperability code resided on the printer toner cartridges and other aspects resided on the
printers purchased by Lexmark's customers. The court of appeals ultimately held that the code
residing on the printers may be copyrightable, and therefore potentially entitled to general
copyright and specific DMCA protection, while the code residing on the toner cartridges was
insufficiently original to merit such protection. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Corp., 387
F.3d 522, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). In the final analysis, the majority of the court felt that even the
software code residing on the printers did not merit copyright or DMCA protection. Id. at 54849.
45.

MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 99-102 (3d ed. 1999)

(offering a general overview of copyrightable literary works and paying specific attention to
computer programs).
46. Whether or not these kinds of software programs are copyrightable will be a casespecific inquiry depending on the facts at hand. In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skyline
Technologies,Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2003), and in the Lexmark and Chamberlain
appeals, the respective courts were not convinced that the software in question was
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access or use by the TPM code functioning as a technological measure
protecting the rights of a copyright owner, the DMCA technically can be
applied to prevent circumvention of the TPM code4 7 and trafficking in a device
that can circumvent either the TPM code 48 or the protection afforded by the
TPM code.49

The TPM code itself also may be copyrightable as a literary work in many
cases. This Article, however, focuses on the use of TPM code as a
technological measure restricting access to copyrighted interoperability code.
The question for discussion here is whether incidental uses of interoperability
code and protections of such code via TPM code in what are basically
transactions involving the sales and leasing of tangible goods that happen to
incorporate some software should be an issue for the DMCA.
In an age where the line between tangible goods and intangible
information products is becoming increasingly difficult to draw with any
clarity, 50 it is necessary to start formulating some rules and policies that might
help to distinguish one from the other. Failure to do so may result in an
inappropriate set of legal rules about intangible information products being
applied to transactions that are not really about information at all, but rather are
standard commercial transactions involving tangible goods. Recent cases
support the notion that such transactions should not attract DMCA liability, and
arguably not even general copyright liability, but these decisions could be
distinguished in subsequent cases on a number of grounds left open by the
courts of appeal in Lexmark and Chamberlainrespectively.5 1 Even if these
decisions stem the tide to some extent in terms of inappropriate litigation under
copyright laws, the adoption of a legislative presumption against DMCA
liability in cases not centrally focused on the prevention of digital copyright
copyrightable. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 544-45; Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1204. However, this
does not mean that no functional software can ever be copyrightable. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at
544-45; Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1204. Software is always functional, and much software is
copyrightable.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
48. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).
49. Id. § 1201(b)(1)(A).
50. This difficulty arises because physical goods increasingly incorporate software code.
See HANK SHIFFMAN, JSTAR: PRACTICAL JAVA AccELERATION FOR INFORMATION APPLIANCES,

at http://www.disordered.org/Java-Embed.html (Feb. 2000) ("Information appliances are a new
class of specialized devices .... ") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Martyn Williams, Wired Appliances Add Surfing to Kitchen Duty, PC WORLD, at
http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/0,aid,5 1584,00.asp (June 4, 2001)
(considering the most recent "attempt[s] to load advanced electronics into home appliances")
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See infra Part II.B--C (discussing the Lexmark and Chamberlaincases).
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piracy would avoid costly litigation that potentially confuses copyright policy
with antitrust and general commercial law and policy. Importantly, such a
presumption would clarify the troubling issue that now arises in digital
copyright litigation-placing a heavy burden of proof on a defendant to
establish that the complainant does not have a realistic case under copyright
law. As Judge Merritt notes in his concurring opinion in Lexmark, this burden
in itself could be a deterrent to innovation and competition, a result that clearly
52
runs counter to the aims of both copyright and antitrust law and policy.
53
B. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.

1. Lexmark in the DistrictCourt
The Lexmark case involved a slightly more complex version of the
situation described above-the use of interoperability software to ensure that
only authorized toner cartridges were purchased for use in a certain class of
Lexmark printers and that unauthorized cartridges manufactured by Lexmark's
competitors would not operate in those printers. The preliminary injunction
granted in favor of Lexmark by the district court recently was overturned by the
Because of the profound
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.54
of specific DMCA
on
the
interpretation
between
the
two
courts
disagreements
provisions and the application of copyright law generally to the facts at hand,
the following discussion commences with a detailed consideration of the
district court's reasoning before considering the Sixth Circuit's analysis.
Lexmark had released two types of toner cartridges into the market for use
with its T-Series printers-regular cartridges and "Prebate" cartridges. 55 The
Prebate cartridges were sold at an upfront discount to customers.56 In exchange
for the discount, the customers were bound contractually to use the Prebate
toner cartridges only once and to return the used cartridges to Lexmark for
remanufacturing and recycling.57 Lexmark's customers could choose freely
52. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 552-53 (6th
Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring).
53. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943 (E.D. Ky.
2003), vacatedby 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
54. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551.
55. Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
56. Id. at 947.
57. Id. at 947 n. 1. A contractual clause to this effect was printed on top of every Prebate
toner cartridge box. The text of the relevant clause read:
RETURN EMPTY CARTRIDGE TO LEXMARK FOR REMANUFACTURING
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which cartridges to buy.58
The contractual restrictions on re-use of Prebate toner cartridges were
supplemented by digital rights management technology (DRM) 59 applied by
Lexmark to both its Prebate toner cartridges and its printers. 6° The DRM
measures consisted of several software programs inserted into the cartridges
and printers.6' In particular, a Printer Engine Program (PEP) was inserted into
the printers to control various printer operations including "paper feed, paper
movement, motor control .... and voltage control. ' 62 The PEP software was
registered as a copyright work at the Copyright Office.63
Lexmark also utilized a set of Toner Loading Programs (TLPs) in its toner
cartridges. 64 These programs enabled the printers to approximate the amount of
AND RECYCLING. Please read before opening. Opening this package or using
the patented cartridge inside confirms your acceptance of the following
license/agreement. This all-new cartridge is sold at a special price subject to a
restriction that it may be used only once. Following this initial use, you agree to
return the empty cartridge only to Lexmark for remanufacturing and recycling. If
you don't accept these terms, return the unopened package to your point of
purchase. A regular price cartridge without these terms is available.
Id.
The case, and the discussion in this Article, proceeded on the basis that this was a valid
contractual term. My own opinion is that the term was valid contractually because it was made
clear to purchasers at the time of purchase, and purchasers were given an option to purchase a
more expensive cartridge without the restriction. There may be an argument that the term
insufficiently was drawn to the attention of consumers and that this was part of a contract of
adhesion. However, contractual clauses relating to uses of software are not invalidated on these
grounds traditionally. It is interesting to note that the agreement in this case is described in the
judgment as a "shrinkwrap" agreement "placed across the top of every Prebate toner cartridge
box." Id. at 947. Technically, the fact that the agreement is presented under a plastic wrap does
not make it a shrinkwrap agreement, particularly if the terms are visible to the customer at the
time of purchase. Shrinkwrap, in its more technical sense, generally refers to terms that are not
available to the customer at the time of purchase but are hidden in a box; the customer does not
get an opportunity to examine the terms until he tears open the plastic wrap and opens the box.
LEAFFER, supra note 45, at 112. In any event, the description of the contractual terms in
Lexmark as shrinkwrap terms is not material to this Article.
58. Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
59. One generally accepted definition of DRM systems is the "secure packaging and
delivery software designed to prevent purchasers and third parties from making unauthorized
uses of digital works." Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infra-Structurefor Rights
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 48 (2001).
60. Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 948-49.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 948.
63. See id. at 948-49 (noting that a computer program is a "literary work" and is protected
from unauthorized copying); LEAFFER, supra note 45, at 99-102 (explaining that computer
programs are copyrightable literary works).
64. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949
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toner left in a toner cartridge; in conjunction with the PEP, the TLP allowed the
printer to display a "toner low" message on the printer screen at an appropriate
time. 65 These programs also were registered at the Copyright Office.66 The
TLPs additionally assisted Lexmark in detecting copyright infringers by
including a Lexmark cartridge identifying reference tag.67
The final design feature of the Lexmark printing system relevant to this
discussion is Lexmark's use of an authentication sequence that was designed to
run "each time a toner cartridge [was] inserted into a Lexmark printer, the
68
printer [was] powered on, or whenever the printer [was] opened or closed. ,
The technical details of the authentication sequence are set out in some detail in
the district court's judgment. 69 Suffice to say that Lexmark's intention in
designing the sequence was that access to the PEP would be disabled unless the
toner cartridge was recognized as an authorized cartridge.70
Lexmark's complaint was that one of its competitors in the toner cartridge
market, Static Control Components (SCC), manufactured a SMARTEK
microchip that could be used to replace the microchip found in Lexmark's toner
cartridges. 71 The aim of the SMARTEK chip was functionally to copy
Lexmark's TLPs and allow unauthorized toner cartridges to function effectively
in Lexmark printers.7 2 Thus, Lexmark sued SCC for both copyright
infringement-for copying the TLPs-and for infringement of the antitrafficking provisions of the DMCA-for trafficking in a device that
circumvented access and used measures attached to Lexmark's copyrighted
PEP and TLP software.73
A number of factors were relevant to the initial grant of the preliminary
injunction by the district court, including SCC's engagement in wholesale
copying of Lexmark's copyrighted software in order to market a competing
product,74 rather than reverse engineering for the purposes of creating an
interoperable computer program.75 In terms of copyright infringement, courts
(E.D. Ky. 2003), vacatedby 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 952.
69. Id. at 952-53.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 955.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 947.
74. Id. at 965.
75. Id. at 959-60 (analyzing the fair use and reverse engineering doctrines derived from
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in the past have accepted a limited fair use exception for "intermediate
copying" engaged in for the sole purpose of reverse engineering in order to
discover the functional requirements to create an interoperable product.76
However, Judge Forester held at first instance in Lexmark that this exception is
narrow and is confined to situations where a computer program is copied in
order to analyze ideas embedded in the program." The exception does not
then incorporated
apply to situations where protected software is copied 7and
8
into a product for "commercial exploitation and profit.
Judge Forester also took the view that SCC had no reverse engineering
of the DMCA. 79 This section provides
defense available under Section 1201 (f)
a defense to infringement of the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions if the
circumvention of an effective technological measure is carried out "for the sole
purpose of identifying and analyzing those elements of the program that are
necessary to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer
program with other programs." 80 Judge Forester held that SCC's SMARTEK
microchips could not be considered "independently created computer
programs" for the purposes of this section because of the wholesale copying of
Lexmark's software. 8' The judge noted that the "microchips serve[d] no
legitimate purpose other than to circumvent Lexmark's authentication
sequence" and that they could not "qualify as independently created when they
contain[ed] exact copies of Lexmark's" TLP software.82
In the tradition of hard cases making bad law, it is arguable that the district
court in Lexmark came to the right practical result on the issues but for the
wrong legal reasons. Even though the district court was overturned on appeal,
the majority of the Sixth Circuit suggested that although the district court was
incorrect in making its findings at the preliminaryinjunction stage, some of the
issues may still be open for further debate at the permanent injunction stage.
Thus, the court of appeals did not necessarily preclude a future court from
ultimately deciding such a case along the lines adopted by the district court, but

Sega EnterprisesLtd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992)).
76. Id. at 959-60.
77. Id. at 959.
78. Id.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (2000).
80. Id. § 1201(0(1).
81. Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
82.

83.
2004).

Id.

Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th Cir.
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rather felt that the district court's decision was inappropriate when applying the
preliminary injunction standard of review. 84
In terms of the underlying policy considerations at issue, Lexmark
apparently had good commercial reasons for marketing its toner cartridges in
the way that it did. Lexmark presented evidence that approximately ninety
percent of the cartridges sold for its T-Series printers were Prebate cartridges
sold at the discount price. 85 Lexmark's remanufacturing program depended on
the return of used Prebate cartridges by its customers.8 6 The court accepted
Lexmark's argument that if customers did not abide by their contractual
agreement to return the cartridges, the cost of Lexmark's remanufacturing
process would be increased and such increases would be passed on to
consumers in the form of more expensive toner cartridges.87
Arguably, the district court should have focused on the merits of this
argument in this case. The underlying policy problem here seems to be what
kind of competition should be permitted in the toner cartridge market(s) rather
than copyright infringement and DMCA infringement. Cases like this should
revolve around rules and policies from commercial, contract, and antitrust law,
rather than from policies of copyright law. In fact, the majority in the Lexmark
appeal made this precise point: "Lexmark's market for its toner cartridges and
the profitability of its Prebate program may well be diminished by the
SMARTEK chip, but that is not the sort of market or value that copyright law
protects. " 88 The difficulty today is that the Sixth Circuit's comment does not
necessarily resolve the legal problem, although it clearly states the policy
concern. For reasons set out below, manufacturers technically may still raise
copyright and DMCA arguments like Lexmark did in this case, depending on
the structure of the software code utilized within a relevant product.
2. The Lexmark Appeal
The appellate court in Lexmark took pains to explain where the district
court erred in its analysis of the relevant laws, both in terms of general
copyright principles and specific DMCA analysis. 89 The Sixth Circuit vacated
84.
85.

Id.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 956

(E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated by 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 545.
See id. at 537-42, 544-45, 546-48, 550 (describing the district court's three legal
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the preliminary injunction and remanded the case back to the district court for
further consideration.9" However, the parties could settle the matter rather than
proceed to further hearings. Regardless of the final outcome of this particular
litigation, the Lexmark appeal does leave certain questions open with respect to
the application of copyright and DMCA law to interoperable physical products
cases. Such questions remain open because the court took care to specify that
its holdings were confined to the preliminary injunction context and would not
necessarily be determinative at the permanent injunction stage.9' The majority
commented on the structure of the software utilized by Lexmark that could be
used to distinguish this decision from a future decision involving an
interoperable physical product incorporating a computer code as a technological
tying device.92
The basic thrust of the appellate decision at first glance may be very
pleasing to those people concerned about inappropriate extensions of copyright
law in general, and the provisions of the DMCA in particular, to these kinds of
situations. The majority of the court of appeals took the view that the software
allegedly copied by SCC (the TLP software) may not be copyrightable for lack
of originality, 93 largely because of the application of merger 94 or scenes Afaire
doctrines, or both.95 Thus, a copyright infringement action might not be
available with respect to SCC's admitted copying of this code at the permanent
injunction stage, and insufficient evidence of a valid copyright work existed to
support a preliminary injunction.96
errors: wrongly concluding that the Toner Loading Program was entitled to copyright
protection, using the incorrect legal standard for distinguishing protectable expression from the
unprotected ideas, and incorrectly assessing whether the Toner Loading Program functions as a
lock-out code).
90. Id. at 551.
91. See id. at 541-42, 544, 550 (noting that the court's analysis only explains why the
district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction was erroneous, not whether a permanent
injunction would issue ultimately).
92. Id. at 548.
93. See id. at 540-41 (noting that the district court erred in holding that the TLP software
had sufficient originality to obtain copyright protection in the context of granting a preliminary
injunction, although originality may be an open question at the permanent injunction stage).
94. Copyright protection may be denied under the merger doctrine when only one way, or
very few ways, exist to express an idea. In such cases, the idea and the expression are said to be
"merged." Id. at 534-35.
95. This doctrine denies copyright protection to a program where the structure of the
program was dictated by practical realities such as hardware and mechanical specifications,
software standards and compatibility requirements, design standards, industry practices, and
standard programming practices. Id. at 535.
96. See id. at 541 (noting that the district court erred in holding that the TLP software had
sufficient originality to obtain copyright protection in the context of granting a preliminary
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Even if a copyright infringement action were available with respect to
SCC's copying of the TLP, the appellate court suggested that SCC might well
avail itself of the fair use defense at the permanent injunction phase of the
case. 97 The Sixth Circuit's comments on fair use are, strictly speaking, dicta
because the majority suggested that it need not consider the fair use defense in
light of its conclusions on the preliminary injunction record that the TLP was
not copyrightable. 98 In a brief fair use analysis, however, the majority
suggested that a fair use defense may be available to SCC largely on the basis
of the fourth "fair use factor" found in 17 U.S.C. § 107-namely, "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for the value of the copyrighted work."99 As
noted above, the court of appeals stated that the district court incorrectly
focused on the market for toner cartridges, rather than on the market for
software code such as the TLP, which may be incorporated into the toner
cartridges. t ° In the Sixth Circuit's view, this error of focus, along with a
mistaken view of the district court that SCC copied the TLP for its commercial
value as a copyright work,10 1should be sufficient grounds for the lower court to
reconsider the fair use issue.
With respect to the DMCA claims, the majority of the Sixth Circuit in
Lexmark found that the SMARTEK chip was not designed primarily to
circumvent technological encryption measures that effectively prevent
unauthorized access to a copyright work. Having held that the TLP is likely not
a copyright work per se, the analysis focused on whether the TLP contained
software code that effectively prevented access to the admittedly copyrightable
PEP code residing in the Lexmark printers.10 2 The Sixth Circuit held that
Lexmark's DMCA claim failed because the relevant code did not actually
control access to the PEP housed on the Lexmark printers. Although the code
in question clearly performed an authentication sequence between a Lexmark
toner cartridge and a Lexmark printer, the actual copyrighted work (the PEP
code) was also accessible directly from the printer by anyone who had

injunction, although originality may be an open question at the permanent injunction stage).
97. Id. at 544.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 544-45.
100. Id. at 545.
101. This issue relates to the first "fair use factor" under 17 U.S.C. § 107, which invites the
court to consider "the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is of a commercial
nature ....Id. at 544.
102. Id. at 546-47.
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purchased, and was therefore authorized to use, a Lexmark printer." 3 The
majority noted that:
Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of the Printer
Engine Program directly from the printer memory, with or without the
benefit of the authentication sequence, and the data from the program may
be translated into readable source code after which copies may be freely
distributed .... No security device, in other words, protects access to the
Printer Engine Program Code and no security device accordingly must be
circumvented to obtain access to that program code.""4
Although the authentication sequence housed on the toner cartridge
blocked one form of access to the PEP, it was freely accessible in other ways. 0 5
In the majority's view, arguing that the authentication sequence is an access
control measure under the DMCA would be like saying that "a lock on the back
door of a6 house 'controls access' to a house whose front door does not contain a
, 10
lock."

Although the access issue made for a compelling argument on the facts at
hand in Lexmark, future manufacturers with copyrighted software analogous to
the PEP in Lexmark might ensure that their product is more effectively locked
and that access is denied to everyone, including those people who have
legitimately purchased the physical product in question. The combination of a
powerful technological lock and contractual license terms forbidding
purchasers to access relevant code would create a situation where the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning in Lexmark would not apply. The decision of the Sixth
Circuit relied on the fortuitous circumstance that Lexmark had not thought to
protect its PEP code more stringently in order to maintain DMCA infringement
proceedings against competitors. 0 7 Future manufacturers may be more careful
in this respect. In fact, the Sixth Circuit's reasoning on this point could now be
read as a recipe for future manufacturers on precisely how to launch a
successful DMCA claim in a subsequent interoperable products case. Armed
with validly copyrighted software such as the PEP and a serious attempt to lock
the code away from all comers, a manufacturer could make out a prima facie
DMCA proceeding despite the judicial determinations in the Lexmark
appeal. 10 8
103.

Id.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 548.

108. In fact, Judge Merritt's concurring opinion in the Lexmark appeal makes precisely this
point. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 551 (6th Cir.
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Lastly, the Lexmark appellate court addressed the "interoperability
defense" under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(3). 1°9 As with the Sixth Circuit's
comments on the fair use defense to copyright infringement, the comments on
the interoperability defense to DMCA infringement are dicta. The majority
noted that it only considered the interoperability defense because the defense
may become relevant at the permanent injunction stage of this dispute."° The
majority's comments on this defense were not particularly illuminating with
respect to ways in which future courts might interpret the defense in similar
cases. The comments are largely fact-specific, focusing on Lexmark's failure to
provide evidence to support certain arguments that would refute the application
of the defense."'l Again, we see little judicial guidance as to precisely how this
defense might be utilized in future litigation.
3. InteroperabilityIssues After Lexmark
Even in the wake of the Lexmark appeal and, for that matter, the
Chamberlainappeal,1 2 a number of worrying issues remain. For example, the
decision leaves future product manufacturers open to craft their software code
differently to ensure that a DMCA argument will be available to them. Judge
Merritt noted in his concurrence in the decision in the Lexmark appeal:
[He would have preferred the majority to have gone further in order to]
make clear that in the future companies like Lexmark cannot use the
DMCA in conjunction with copyright law to create monopolies of
manufactured goods for themselves just by tweaking the facts of this case:
by, for example, creating a Toner Loading Program that is more complex
and "creative" than the one
3 here, or by cutting off other access to the
Printer Engine Program."

2004) (Merritt, J., concurring). Judge Merritt stated:
We should make clear that in the future companies like Lexmark cannot use the
DMCA in conjunction with copyright law to create monopolies of manufactured
goods for themselves just by tweaking the facts of this case: by, for example,
creating a Toner Loading Program that is more complex and "creative" than the one
here, or by cutting off other access to the Printer Engine Program.
Id.
109. Id. at 550-51 (explaining the district court's erroneous conclusions with respect to the
defense).
110. ld. at 550.
111. Id. at550-51.
112. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Chamberlainappeal).
113. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551 (Merritt, J., concurring).
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However, the majority does not go this far, arguably leaving these questions
open for future courts, and, indeed even for the district court on remand in
Lexmark if the matter does not settle prior to a rehearing of the substantive
issues.
By not creating a clear rule or presumption against DMCA liability in
these kinds of interoperable products cases, the Lexmark decision also did not
address the burden of proof problem raised by Judge Merritt in his concurring
opinion: "[W]e should be wary of shifting the burden to a rival manufacturer to
demonstrate that its conduct falls under [an exception to DMCA liability] in
cases where there is no indication that it has any intention of pirating a
protected work." 1 4 He expressed a concern that placing too much of a burden
on defendants in this class of cases could deter innovation and competition by
allowing monopolists to threaten smaller commercial rivals with the cost of
protracted litigation. 115 Judge Merritt is unquestionably correct here. The
problem is that the current drafting of the DMCA does not make it clear that
the legislative intention was not to place this kind of burden on defendants in
interoperable physical products cases. The legislative presumption advocated
in this Article would address this problem by ensuring that future plaintiffs bear
the burden of establishing that the protection of a copyright work against digital
piracy is a central commercial concern.
Because the Lexmark appeal did not discuss the fair use defense to
copyright infringement and the interoperability defense to DMCA infringement
in significant detail, the case adds little in the way of judicial guidance on the
future application of these defenses in this class of cases. In particular, little
guidance exists as to the availability of a fair use defense with respect to a
DMCA claim. As noted above, the weight of current judicial opinion is that,
despite the inclusion of Section 1201(c)(1) in the DMCA, fair use is not a
defense to an action about unauthorized access to a copyright work. 16 Both the
Lexmark and the Skylink courts of appeals suggested that there must be some
relationship between fair use and the DMCA because of the inclusion of this
section in the legislation." 7 However, these suggestions do not sit well with
114. Id. at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 552-53 (Merritt, J., concurring).
116. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (stating that courts do not allow the fair use
defense to apply to accessing a copyrighted work without authority).
117. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 562 (6th Cir.
2004) (Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that the DMCA does not affect
defenses to copyright infringement); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d
1178, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same).
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previous authority, and some further legislative guidance may ultimately be
necessary to decide this issue. Although this argument is not the focus of the
suggestions made in this Article, this issue requires further consideration in the
future. At least the adoption of a legislative presumption such as that suggested
in this Article should minimize the extent to which courts would need to
consider the issue in the interoperable products context.
Finally, and this is perhaps a smaller technical point, the issue remains that
the Sixth Circuit in Lexmark was mindful of the fact that it was handing down a
decision to overturn a preliminary injunction. It criticized the district court's
application of a preliminary injunction standard of review. The appellate court
left open the possibility that a number of the key issues, such as copyrightability
of relevant code and application of the DMCA provisions, could be decided
differently at the permanent injunction stage."18
As suggested by Judge Merritt, clear measures should be taken to confine
DMCA liability in interoperability cases to situations where the interoperable
product in question is actually a copyright work, such as a computer game
stored in a video game cartridge, a movie stored on a DVD-ROM or videotape,
or a collection of copyrighted music stored on a CD or audio tape."l 9 Congress
120
enacted the DMCA to prevent piracy of such valuable information products.
The reason for confining DMCA liability to such cases, even if a general
copyright remedy may be available to a plaintiff in a noncontent-industry
focused case, is taken up below.' 21 Basically, the argument is that whereas
copyright law protects works in many different contexts, the DMCA is aimed
specifically at digital piracy and carries heavy penalties, including criminal
sanctions, for infringement. The DMCA also has more limited defenses and
exceptions available to a defendant than traditional copyright infringement
proceedings. The application of the DMCA should, therefore, be limited to
appropriate digital piracy contexts, despite the potential for a general copyright
infringement action in a nondigital-piracy case.
At the very least, a presumption against the application of the DMCA
should exist unless the manufacturer of the physical good can show that
118. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 540-42, 544, 550.
119. Id. at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring).
120.: See Burk, supra note 7, at 1135 (noting that the legislative aims behind the drafting of
the DMCA were to prevent "piracy" in digital works); Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra
note 1, at 1 (noting that by enacting the DMCA, Congress meant to stop copyright pirates from
defeating antipiracy protections added to copyrighted works and to ban "black box" devices
intended for that purpose).
121. See infra Part III.A (discussing the wisdom of confining DMCA liability in
interoperability cases to situations where the product is actually a copyright work).
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prevention of digital copyright piracy is a central commercial concern in the
case. 122 Bearing in mind that the DMCA originally was directed at the
prevention of digital copyright piracy at the behest of industries like the movie
industry and the music industry,' 23 applying it without more careful
consideration to situations where digital copyright piracy is not the subject of
the plaintiffs concern seems to be drawing a long bow.
C. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.

24

The Chamberlainlitigation was similar in nature to the Lexmark litigation,
although in Chamberlain, neither the district court nor the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals was particularly convinced by a complainant manufacturer's
claims of copyright and DMCA infringements allegedly committed by a
commercial competitor. In particular, the court of appeals favored an
interpretation of the DMCA that would restrict its application to cases
involving bona fide attempts to prevent copyright infringement. 2 5 The
plaintiff, Chamberlain, manufactured and marketed a "Security+" garage dooropener system.126 The system involved a "rolling computer code" intended1 to
27
make the system more secure than traditional garage-door-opening systems.
The remote control device, usually kept in a user's car, transmitted the
rolling code to the receiver/door-opening mechanism in the purchaser's garage.
Thus, relevant "rolling code software" was incorporated both into the portable
remote control device and the receiver/door-opening mechanism. Chamberlain

122. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring) (noting that "a better reading of
the [DMCA] is that it requires plaintiffs as part of their burden of pleading and persuasion to
show a purpose to pirate on the part of defendants").
123. Burk, supra note 7, at 1135 (noting that content industries lobbying Congress for anticircumvention provisions emphasized the potential for digital piracy as the chief concern); Gord
Larose, Law, Politics, and Policy As They Impact DRM, at http://www.infomech.com/drm..policy.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2004) (describing various interest groups that
have lobbied for and against the DMCA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (N.D. I11.
2003).
125. See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202 (noting that the DMCA "prohibits only forms of
access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise
affords copyright owners").
126. Chamberlain, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1025-26.
127. Id. at 1027-29 (describing operation of rolling code mechanism).
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had registered both versions of the software-the version in the28remote control
and the version in the door opener-at the Copyright Office.
In competition with Chamberlain, Skylink marketed a universal garagedoor-opener transmitter that could operate effectively with a Chamberlain
garage-door-opening mechanism. 129 Skylink sold the universal transmitter to
consumers as either a replacement for lost remote control devices or as an
additional transmitter. 130 Thus the universal transmitters were sold in
competition with Chamberlain and generally at a lower price than
Chamberlain's transmitters.' 3 1 Chamberlain argued that Skylink's conduct in
marketing its universal transmitters constituted various infringements of the
anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA.132 Chamberlain argued that its rolling
code software was a copyright work that incorporated elements of DRM to
protect itself effectively against unauthorized access and use. 133
Chamberlain was ultimately unsuccessful for a number of reasons, both at
first instance and on appeal of Skylink's successful summary judgment motion
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 134 For one thing, there was
35
doubt that the rolling code software was copyrighted validly in the first place.
Further, even if there had been a circumvention of a technological protection
measure for DMCA purposes, neither the district court nor the court of appeals36
was convinced that it was unauthorizedas required for DMCA infringement.1
Both courts accepted Skylink's argument that Chamberlain must implicitly
authorize its customers-to whom it distributes its software embedded in the
remote control-to purchase any brand of transmitter that will open their garage
door. 137 It arguably cannot be the case that consumers who purchase a garagedoor-opening system are locked in to using only one brand of replacement
128. Id. at 1027.
129. Id. at 1026.
130. Id. at 1030-32.
131. Id. at 1033.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2000).
133. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (N.D.
111.
2003).
134. Id.; Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. SkylinkTechs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
135. Chamberlain, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (finding that a disputed issue of fact exists
regarding whether or not the current rolling code computer program is in fact protected by
copyright).
136. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000).
137. See Chamberlain, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1039-40 (finding that garage owners likely
would be authorized implicitly to circumvent Chamberlain's rolling code); Chamberlain,381
F.3d at 1204 (finding that Chamberlain's customers likely would be authorized implicitly to
circumvent the encryption code on the garage door opener).
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transmitter if they lose the original remote control.1 38 As Judge Pallmeyer
stated in the opinion granting Skylink's summary judgment motion:
[Garage door opener] transmitters are similar to television remote controls
in that consumers of both products may need to replace them at some point
due to damage or loss, and may program them to work with other devices
manufactured by different companies. In both cases, consumers have a
reasonable expectation39that they can replace the original product without
violating federal law. 1
This is really the heart of the problem addressed in this Article. Although
the focus of this discussion is about creating a specific exemption within the
DMCA for the creation of interoperable physical goods that incidentally
incorporate copyrighted or copyrightable computer code, more difficult policy
issues underlie the DMCA concerns. These concerns have to do with the
nature of personal property in the new millennium, particularly as the
distinction between physical goods and information products becomes
increasingly blurred. This is a phenomenon largely caused by the fact that
more and more digital technology is now being incorporated into physical items
from large scale industrial machinery, to car motors, to basic household
appliances ranging from digital pianos, to stereo systems, to the humble
toaster. 140
The court of appeals in Chamberlainwas extremely cognizant of the fact
that the case involved the evolving nature of personal property rights in the
digital age. The decision concludes with the assertion that "[t]he DMCA does
not create a new property right for copyright owners.' 41 The judgment favors
courts interpreting the DMCA claims to require the plaintiff to demonstrate a
link between the DMCA claim and a serious concern about copyright
infringement. According to the courts, "A copyright owner seeking to impose
[DMCA] liability on an accused circumventor must demonstrate a reasonable
relationship between the circumvention at issue and a use relating to a property
right for which the Copyright Act permits the owner to withhold
138. Judge Pallmeyer made the point for the district court that in using a universal remote
control device manufactured by a competitor of Chamberlain, the consumer may lose the
protection of Chamberlain's warranty because it does not cover use of unauthorized accessories.
However, this in itself is not sufficient to show that consumers of Chamberlain's products are
not authorized to use universal remote control devices with a Chamberlain garage door opener.
Chamberlain,292 F. Supp. 2d at 1045.
139. Id. at 1046.
140. UCITA § 102 cmt. 7 (2002), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/
2002final.pdf (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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authorization. ,142 The DMCA itself should not be interpreted as creating new
property rights. Otherwise, a company could use the DMCA to leverage its
sales into after-market monopolies. 143 Such a practice normally would be
prohibited by general antitrust laws and, more specifically, the copyright misuse
doctrine. 144

The extent to which an owner of personal property can incorporate aftersale restrictions on the use of a physical good has never been particularly clear
in our legal system. Such restrictions, recently described as "personal property
servitudes" by Professor Glen Robinson, 145 raise difficult issues of policy at the
intersection of property, contract, and antitrust law. As intellectual property is
implicated increasingly in relevant disputes, particularly in the context of
detailed intellectual property licenses purporting to impose restrictions on
licensees, it becomes imperative that we resolve some of these confusions.
The appeal decision in Chamberlain may be regarded as a good start
because of the powerful suggestion in the case that DMCA liability should be
limited to situations involving copyright infringements. Undoubtedly, this view
is correct as a matter of policy. However, it does not necessarily accord with
the current drafting of the DMCA, which does not require evidence of an actual
or potential copyright infringement as the basis for a DMCA claim.
Additionally, the actual holding in Chamberlaindoes not prevent companies in
the future from using contractual terms to limit the "authorized uses" of their
products and the software incorporated therein to avoid the argument that their
customers, as well as the alleged infringers of the DMCA (their commercial
competitors), are making or enabling authorized uses of the copyrightable or
copyrighted software. In some circumstances, such companies may still be able
to plead their cases to ensure that a stronger link could be made between a
potential copyright infringement and the alleged DMCA liability, particularly if
they had not "authorized" a particular use of the relevant software code.'46
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id. at 1201.
Id.
See Glen 0. Robinson, PersonalProperty Servitudes (2003) (suggesting that there

may be little rationale under personal property law or intellectual property law to prevent
proprietary servitudes from attaching to tangible and intangible personal property as incidents of
property ownership), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract=477541 (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
146. A manufacturer's ability to do so depends on whether competing interests in
copyrightable software like fair use defenses are regarded as actual rights to use the software in
the purchaser's hands, or merely a tolerated convenience. It has never been clear whether fair
use provides affirmative legal rights in the hands of the fair user with respect to relevant
copyright material, although some courts have recently suggested as much. In fact, the court of
appeals in Chamberlain appears to assume that fair use is a legal right. See Chamberlain,381
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Similar reasoning applied in the Lexmark situation. 147 Nothing in the Lexmark
appeal prevents a manufacturer of a printer toner cartridge from technologically
and contractually excluding a consumer from accessing a copyrighted Printer
Engine Program.
As the Chamberlainand Lexmark cases both demonstrate, consumers and
commercial competitors may have very different normative expectations than
an original product manufacturer about what conduct is appropriate with
respect to the product in an after-market context. The Chamberlaindecision
certainly demonstrates increasing judicial concerns about protecting the
reasonable expectations of the average consumer purchasing a remote control
mechanism to open a garage door. Surely consumers must have an implicit
right to buy a product that will enable them to utilize their garage door openers.
On the other hand, the Lexmark situation demonstrated a more serious
attempt by a product manufacturer, through the use of contract and
technological protection measures, to limit the uses a consumer may make of its
Prebate toner cartridges after the initial sale. Here, the district court in its initial
decision was quite sympathetic to the rights of the manufacturer, although the
majority of the court of appeals ultimately did not share these views. Judge
Forester in the district court showed less concern for the position of the ultimate
consumers, although he made the point that consumers do have an initial choice
not to purchase a Prebate cartridge. 148 He was mindful that consumers could
elect to pay a higher price for a toner cartridge that they were entitled to refill
themselves or have refilled by a third-party toner cartridge manufacturer.' 4 9
Thus, if a consumer chose the cheaper Prebate cartridge, it is not necessarily
unreasonable to expect her to abide by the contractual condition to return the
cartridge to Lexmark for remanufacturing. Some of these ideas were mirrored
in Judge Feikens's partial dissenting opinion in the appeal in Lexmark. With
respect, to the toner cartridges, which the majority found to incorporate
noncopyrightable software code, Judge Feikens noted that "[s]ince the
consumer is only authorized to use the Prebate cartridge until the toner runs
out, it follows that
the license also blocks the consumer from using the TLP
50
after that time."

F.3d at 1200 (noting the significance of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c) in preserving the fair use defense).
147. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 546-47 (6th
Cir. 2004) (discussing Lexmark's DMCA claim that the authentication sequence blocked access

to the software code).
148. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948
(2003), vacated by 337 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
149. Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
150. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 563 (Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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More work needs to be done by judges, legislators, and commentators in
unbundling the complex legal and social/cultural issues that may be in conflict
here; that is, in ascertaining and implementing legal rules that reflect
appropriate social norms about limitations that a manufacturer may validly
place on uses of its products after an initial sale. However, at the very least it is
important that the DMCA's operation should be restricted to disputes that are
really about digital copyright piracy. Its application should not be extended to
disputes that only incidentally involve copyrightable software code, unless the
plaintiff can rebut a presumption against doing so.
III. Craftinga Workable Exceptionfor InteroperableProducts
A. Physical Goods and Information Assets
Obviously, there are many open questions about precisely what restrictions
the manufacturer of a product should be entitled to place in downstream
commerce as a matter of policy.' 5' However, those questions should be
answered within appropriate legal frameworks, such as contract law, sales law,
licensing law, and antitrust law. 152 One of the overriding problems with cases
such as Lexmark and Chamberlainis the attempt to utilize copyright law to
deal with these problems and, more particularly, reliance by manufacturers of
such products on the anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA.
Congress intended these provisions to guard against piracy of digital
copyright works. 153 They were not intended to protect producers of physical
goods against downstream commercial competition on the basis that a specific
physical good might happen to incorporate some copyrightable software
code. 154 The results in Lexmark and Chamberlainare heartening because they
evidence the fact that judges to date have not been particularly sympathetic to
attempts to distort digital copyright law in this direction. However, they do
evidence a worrying reliance by commercial plaintiffs on the DMCA's antitrafficking provisions in cases that are not really about digital copyright piracy.
Further, the ultimate decisions in these cases do not close the door on future
151. See generally Robinson, supra note 145.
152. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1201 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (noting that copyright law, augmented by the DMCA, should not interfere with the usual
operation of antitrust and copyright misuse principles).
153. Burk, supra note 7, at 1135 (noting that legislative aims behind the drafting of the
DMCA were to prevent "piracy" in digital works).
154. Chamberlain,381 F.3d at 1193 (noting that the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions
do not establish a new property right).
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plaintiffs trying to do the same thing. More producers of tangible products may
well rely on the incidental incorporation of copyrightable software into their
physical goods to control downstream commerce. They may even use the
majority's reasoning in Lexmark to give them guidance as to how to structure
their software code to ensure copyrightability and the potential availability of a
DMCA claim against a commercial competitor.
This is not the first time in commercial practice that problems have arisen
in terms of ascertaining the appropriate classification of a case that involves
both tangible goods and information goods. In fact, problems like this probably
will increase in coming years because physical goods incorporate more and
more digital technology. Thus, it is extremely important for those engaged in
the lawmaking process to be aware of the implications of these advances in
technology and manufacturing for the future development of both
commercial 55 and intellectual property laws. In particular, it is necessary for
legislatures to start creating clear rules to establish which set of policy
principles will govern such situations.
B. Lessons from UCITA
One obvious recent example of where this kind of problem has been
confronted in legislative drafting occurred in the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (UCITA). 156 Although this proposed law has
been relatively unsuccessful in practice 157 and has only been adopted in two
states,158 its drafting provides a good example of the problem under discussion
here.
The drafters intended UCITA to be a uniform state law that would provide
a set of default rules for contracts the subject matter of which was computer
information. 159 Although "computer information" was quite broadly defined in
155. In this context, I regard "commercial law" as incorporating the Uniform Commercial
Code, general contract law, and antitrust law.
156. See generally UCITA.
157. See generally Letter from Attorneys General to NCCUSL, at http://www.arl.org/
info/frnI/copy/agoppltr.htm (July 23, 1999) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
158. UCITA has been adopted in Maryland and Virginia. NAT'LCONFERENCEOFCOMM'RS
ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, A FEW FACTS ABOUT THE UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccus/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited Nov.
11, 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See UCITA § 102(11) (2002) (defining "computer information transaction" as "an
agreement or the performance of it to create, modify, transfer, or license computer information
or informational rights in computer information").
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the statute, it is basically a slightly expansive way of referring to
computer software.16° The initial impetus for drafting UCITA was that
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), particularly Articles 2 and 2A,
traditionally provided default contract rules for parties engaged in sales
and licensing transactions that focused on physical goods. The drafters
thought that the increase in prevalence of computer information
transactions in the latter part of the twentieth century necessitated a new
set of contractual default rules to cater specifically to these agreements.16,
One important task that faced the drafters of UCITA was working
out how to distinguish the scope of the new legislation from that of the
existing Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC. Clearly, Articles 2 and 2A would
apply to transactions involving traditional personal property, and UCITA
was intended to cover only those transactions involving computer
information. However, the drafters were faced with the same problem
now arising under the DMCA: What to do about a mixed transaction that
involves both computer information and physical goods.
The drafters' solution is found in Section 103 of UCITA. This
section sets out rules that attempt to delineate transactions or individual
aspects of transactions that should be governed by UCITA from those
that should be regulated under the UCC. Section 103(b)(1) provides that
if a transaction includes computer information as well as goods, UCITA
will apply to the part of the transactions that involves "computer
information, informational rights in it, 162 and creations or modifications of
160. See id. § 102 (10) (defining "computer information" as "information in electronic form
which is obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of being
processed by a computer" and explaining that "[t] he term includes a copy of the information and
any documentation or packaging associated with the copy").
161. UCITA was originally conceived as a new Article 2B for the UCC. For five years
between 1995 and 1999, during a decade ofjoint effort, the American Law Institute (ALl) and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) were drafting
UCITA to be Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code. Many members of ALl became
critical of the proposed Article 2B and ALI withdrew its participation and support in drafting
the highly controversial proposed law that was supposed to be promulgated to the fifty states for
uniform adoption. After AlI withdrew from the joint drafting committee, NCCUSL renamed
the law UCITA, which, as a uniform act, only would require the vote of NCCUSL at its
conference while a UCC article also would have required ALl approval. Ed Foster, What is
UCITA?, Infoworld, at http://www.infoworld.comcgi-bin/displayStory.pl?features/990531
ucital.htm (Aug. 30, 1999) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
162. See UCITA § 102(38) (2002). This section defines informational rights to encompass:
[AIIl rights in information created under laws governing patents, copyrights, mask
works, trade secrets, trademarks, publicity rights, or any other law that gives a
person, independently of contract, a right to control or preclude another person's
use of or access to the information on the basis of the rights holder's interest in the
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The Section further provides that where a copy of a computer program is
contained in or sold or leased as part of moveable goods,' 64 UC1TA will apply to the
copy and the computer program only if "the goods are a computer or a computer
peripheral";' 65 or "if giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to, or use of, the
program is ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods of the type sold or
166
leased.
The legislative aim behind Section 103 was to ensure that when a transaction
involves physical goods and computer information, UCITA would apply to the
transaction only to the extent that the subject matter involved computer information.
Thus, the incidental incorporation of software into a physical product would not
bring a transaction involving that product under the ambit of UCITA' s contractual
default rules automatically. A transaction involving tangible personal property
would continue to be governed by Articles 2 and 2A of the UCC, and UCITA
would only come into play to the extent that a part of the transaction actually
focused on rights or liabilities with respect to computer information that may be
incorporated into the product. Maybe the drafters of the DMCA could learn
something from this approach.
In fact, the commentary to UCITA talks specifically about products like those
under judicial consideration in Lexmark and Chamberlain.Paragraph 4(b)(3) of the
commentary mentions situations where a computer program is embedded and
contained in goods. 167 The commentators explain that the general Section 103 rules
are intended to apply in such cases; that is, UCITA applies to the computer program
while goods law applies to the goods. However, "in some cases.., an68embedded
program is a mere part of the goods and [UCITA] should not apply.'
it.'

information.

Id.
163.
164.

Id. § 103(b)(1).
See id. § 102(33) (defining "goods"). This section explains that the term "goods"

encompasses:
[A]ll things that are movable at the time relevant to the computer information
transaction. The term includes the unborn young of animals, growing crops, and
other identified things to be severed from realty which are covered by [Section 2107 of the Uniform Commercial Code]. The term does not include computer
information, money, the subject matter of foreign exchange transactions,
documents, letters of credit, letter-of-credit rights, instruments, investment
property, accounts, chattel paper, deposit accounts, or general intangibles.

Id.
165.

Id. § 103(b)(1)(A).

166.

Id. § 103(b)(1)(B).

167.

Id. § 103 cmt. 4.b.(3).

168.

Id.
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The commentary goes on to flesh out the distinction between mixed goods
and goods that only incidentally incorporate computer information:
[UCITA] does not apply to a copy of a program on a computer chip
embedded as part of an automobile engine and sold or leased as an
indistinguishable part of the automobile containing the engine. On the
other hand, [UCITA] does apply to a copy of a program contained on a
computer chip in a computer and transferred along with the computer.' 69
This is a very useful distinction in practice because it focuses on the
characterization of particular products even in situations where the product
is mixed. The drafters of UCITA did not think it was too difficult to ask
transacting parties, and ultimately courts, to decide whether the product in
question was a physical good that incidentally incorporated valuable
software, or rather an information asset that happened to be contained
within a particular physical storage device such as a hard disc or CD-ROM.
The basic premise is to work out what the parties were actually contracting
for-was it the physical product or the computer information? UCITA was
to apply to a transaction to the extent that the subject matter of the parties'
bargain was computer information.
Although UCITA is a very different kind of a law from the DMCA,
this approach to characterizing valuable commercial assets may be
instructive for drafters of any future revisions to the DMCA and for courts
interpreting the current provisions of the DMCA. It might help to avoid the
"unintended consequences" that could arise if future litigants pursue the
path of raising arguments such as those raised by the plaintiffs in Lexmark
and Chamberlain.
Under an approach that draws from the UCITA example, courts and
future legislators could help to focus attention on appropriate aspects of
relevant disputes and thus avoid blurring the lines between contract law,
antitrust law, and copyright law. Each of these bodies of law has its own
separate underlying policies and principles developed over many
generations. There is no question that these bodies of law intersect with
each other at various points, but this is all the more reason to maintain a
clear focus on the policies underlying each body of law and each relevant
principle of law when adjudicating disputes at the intersecting points. The
various judgments in the Lexmark appeal
evidence that the judges
170
appreciated these important distinctions, despite some ambiguity within
169. Id.
170. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545 (6th
Cir. 2004) ("Lexmark's market for its toner cartridges and the profitability of its Prebate

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2005)
71

the DMCA as currently drafted.
If a dispute is truly characterized as being about copyright law, then
copyright policies and principles should apply, including those derived
from the DMCA. However, if the dispute is not about copyright, courts
should focus on what the dispute really is about and apply the appropriate
set of principles and policies. It may be the case that some disputes
involving physical goods are about copyright to some extent, but only in a
limited way (for example, where a dispute revolves around a physical
product that happens to incorporate some valuable copyrighted code, but
where the commercial focus of the plaintiff is on protecting the physical
product from perceived unfair competition in a downstream market). The
Lexmark and Chamberlaincases are probably good examples of this class
of case.
In such cases, it may be that the plaintiff should have a limited claim
for copyright infringement in terms of any software that is actually copied
by the defendant, depending on the circumstances and, of course, the
copyrightability of the software. However, there are good arguments why
the plaintiff should be limited to this remedy in copyright, supplemented by
remedies from commercial law that are really about trade in tangible goods.
Adding DMCA liability to copyright liability in these kinds of cases may be
an example of an undesirable extension of the powerful sanctions 172 under
the DMCA to circumstances they were not intended to cover-that is, to
situations that are not really about the prevention of digital copyright
piracy.
program may well be diminished by the SMARTEK chip, but that is not the sort of market or
value that copyright law protects."). The Sixth Circuit went on to explain:
Giving authors monopolies over manufactured goods as well as over their creative
expressions will clearly not "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,"
but rather would stifle progress by stamping out competition from manufacturers
who may be able to design better or less expensive replacement parts like toner
cartridges.
Id. at 553.
171. In Lexmark, most of the judges referred to the legislative intentions behind the
drafting of the DMCA as expressed in Congressional debates. Id. at 549, 564. However, there
are nevertheless ambiguities on the face of the statute about its operation in interoperable
physical products cases as this discussion demonstrates.
172. Civil remedies for violations of the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions
of the DMCA could include temporary and permanent injunctions, impoundment of the
violating device or product, statutory or actual damages, costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and
remedial modification or destruction of the violating device or product. 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(c) (2000). Criminal sanctions for willful violations for commercial advantage or private
financial gain could lead to fines up to $500,000 or up to five years in prison for a first offence,
or $1,000,000 or up to ten years in prison for any subsequent offence. Id. § 1204(a).
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C. Revising the DMCA
1. Shifting the Burden to the Complainant
Specific revisions to the DMCA along these lines would add more
certainty of policy in its application to these kinds of cases and would provide
clearer legislative guidance on the application of the DMCA to cases involving
"mixed" products incorporating both physical and "informational" components.
Such revisions would not cure all the current perceived defects of the DMCA.
There are a number of other unintended consequences that arise under the
DMCA, including the fate of the fair use defense more generally, as discussed
above. 173
However, this discussion is limited to interoperable physical products
cases for two reasons. First, future revisions to the DMCA likely will occur in
a piecemeal fashion. In coming years, the DMCA likely will be revised by
specific exemptions to cater to particular situations of concern, rather than more
generic revisions to the underlying operation of the access and control
restrictions. 174 Second, a broad, generic revision of the operation of the
DMCA, if it were to take place, likely would cater generally to issues such as
the fair use defense to copyright infringement. In particular it likely would
result in relaxation of access and use control measures for fair use purposes
such as educational and scientific uses. Such revisions may not effectively
encompass the issues under consideration here, that is, the increasing confusion
as to whether and when to apply the newer principles of digital copyright law to
disputes involving mixed products that incorporate both physical attributes and
computer information.
Revisions to the DMCA aimed specifically at this problem could be
modelled on the subject matter characterization approach taken in UCITA to
distinguishing transactions involving physical goods from those involving
computer information. Obviously, there are significant differences in
173. See Burk, supra note 7, at 1137-38 (discussing the future of the fair use doctrine with
respect to the DMCA and anti-circumvention ights). See generally Yochai Benkler, Siren
Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (2001)
(discussing the impact of recent government actions concerning new communication
technologies on fundamental values of autonomy and democratic discourse); David Nimmer, A
Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 673 (2000)
(discussing the impact of the DMCA on the fair use defense to copyright infringement).
174. Certainly, this appears to be what the drafters had in mind when they incorporated the
provision that the Librarian of Congress periodically could exempt certain activities from the
DMCA. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(B)-(a)(1)(D) (2000) (providing the existing provisions of the
DMCA that allow the Librarian of Congress to make determinations to exempt certain conduct
from anti-circumvention prohibitions).
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application between UCITA and the DMCA. For one thing, UCITA is
intended to provide a set of default contract rules for computer information
transactions, whereas the DMCA is intended to regulate access to, and use of,
copyright works. However, that is not a reason why lessons about subject
matter characterization from UCITA cannot be applied in the DMCA context.
In fact, if commercial and transactional laws become concerned increasingly
with characterization issues, there is arguably good reason for laws dealing with
intellectual property rights to be similarly concerned.
One of the main problems with the way all these laws are drafted is that
commercial lawyers generally are not experts in issues of intellectual property
law and vice versa. Thus, there is a risk that laws drafted by one set of experts
can overreach and impact areas in which they were not intended to apply. This
is arguably what could happen with the DMCA and interoperable physical
goods in the future. Though the drafters of UCITA were careful to delineate
the transactions to which UCITA's provisions were intended to apply, 75 the
drafters of the DMCA did not concern themselves too much with the
limitations of the access and control provisions they were imposing on the
greater commercial community. Instead, they presumed that the legislative
carve-outs, such as the reverse engineering defense in 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(3),
would suffice to avoid the kinds of problems addressed here. 176 Provided that
the DMCA achieved the intended goals of restricting digital copyright piracy,
Congress did not seem to be particularly concerned that the DMCA might
overreach into too many other areas of commerce, outside of the digital
copyright piracy cases. 177
It is particularly important that federal intellectual property laws do not
have the potential to overreach like this because such a result could have a
dramatic impact on inconsistent state law.1 78 At the intersection of intellectual
175. It is worth noting that the purpose of these limitations was not really to avoid conflict
with federal intellectual property laws, but rather to prevent conflict with Articles 2 and 2A of
the UCC. Thus, the concerns of the commercial lawyers drafting UCITA were to avoid conflict
with other commercial law and not necessarily to avoid conflict with federal intellectual
property law. This was probably a reasonable approach in the circumstances because a
harmonized uniform state law would have been preempted by federal intellectual property law
in any event.
176. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 550 (6th
Cir. 2004).
177. See Burk, supra note 7, at 1135-36 (stating that the actual drafting of the DMCA anticircumvention provisions are strange in their reach given Congress's concern with preventing
digital piracy and acknowledging that legislative history indicates Congress did not intend to
extend the reach of the anti-circumvention provisions to protecting content owners' exclusivity
over adjacent, uncopyrighted technologies).
178. The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land. When a state law
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property and commercial law, much of the latter body of law, such as contract
and trade secret laws, is state law. Thus, it is very important for the federal law
to state clearly its limitations where possible and appropriate.
In terms of the DMCA and interoperable goods, Congress should revise
the DMCA to incorporate a rebuttable presumption against DMCA liability
(a) where the copyright work in question is merely incidental to a product
manufactured by the complainant and (b) where a technological encryption
measure has been circumvented for the purpose of creating an interoperable
physical product. Arguably, this is distinct from the current Section 1201(f)
exemption for reverse engineering to create interoperable software products.
Thus, if a complainant manufactures a physical good that happens to
incorporate software as part of its mechanical workings, such as a television set
or motor car, and also incorporates some encryption of that software to prevent
competitors manufacturing interoperable parts, the competitor that did
manufacture an interoperable part would be entitled to a presumption against
DMCA liability.
The presumption would operate to place the initial burden of proof on the
plaintiff to establish the importance of protecting the copyright work against
piracy as a central commercial concern in the dispute. This is not unlike the
judicial presumption suggested by Judge Merritt in his concurring opinion in
the Lexmark appeal.' 79 Judge Merritt suggested that "a better reading of the
statute [than the majority's reasoning] is that it requires plaintiffs as part of
their burden of pleading and persuasion to show a purpose to pirate on the part
of the defendants."'180 However, I have chosen a presumption involving a
requirement that the plaintiff establish the importance of the copyrighted
software as such, rather than that the plaintiff establish the defendant's
"purpose to pirate" because it would seem to be a fairer approach from the
plaintiff's point of view.
Although plaintiffs may well try to employ DMCA arguments in bad faith,
as was arguably the case in Lexmark and Chamberlain,circumstances may
exist in which the protection of a copyright work in a "mixed goods" scenario is
a central concern of the plaintiff. In such a case, it would seem unfair to ask the
plaintiff to establish evidence of the defendant's purpose in creating its
conflicts with, interferes with, or is contrary to a federal statute or treaty, the state law is
preempted or rendered void by the federal law under the Supremacy Clause (Clause 2) of Article
2.
VI of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
179. See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551-53 (Merritt, J., concurring) (suggesting that a better
reading of the DMCA would place the burden on the plaintiff to show a motive to pirate by the
defendant).
180. Id. at 552.
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competing product. The plaintiff may find it difficult to obtain evidence of the
defendant's intentions, and it seems more reasonable to ask the plaintiff to
establish the importance of the copyrighted software as such in the context of
the dispute in question. The evidence to do so will more likely be in the control
of the plaintiff, or easily obtainable by the plaintiff, than evidence of the
defendant's alleged purposes and intentions. A plaintiff acting in bad faith may
find such a requirement sufficiently onerous to deter frivolous DMCA
litigation.
Thus, the plaintiff could rebut the presumption against DMCA liability if
it could demonstrate that the protection of the copyright work in question is a
centrally important commercial concem. For example, the plaintiff might
discharge its burden of proof and rebut the presumption against DMCA liability
if it could establish that the presence of specific software within a product
constitutes an integral part of the product's appeal to prospective purchasers
within a relevant market. In other words, plaintiffs would try to show that
purchasers know they are buying the software specifically as a part of the
product and intend to purchase the software as part of a "mixed package."
This is similar to the idea underlying Section 103 of UCITA. A purchaser
of a toner cartridge or garage-door-opening device may not see software as
integral to their purchasing needs. Indeed, they may be unaware of the
software's presence within the relevant device. On the other hand, the
purchaser of a specific model of CD or DVD player for a console in a motor
vehicle may be relying on specific digital technology to be incorporated into the
device in question. This perhaps sounds similar to a test for establishing
goodwill in a trademark context. However, the difference is that the DMCA
context only requires purchasers consciously to contract for relevant
copyrightable digital technology as part of their purchase, not to be attracted to
a particular brand of software code.
In any event, consumer expectations might only be one of a number of
"commercial significance" factors for software in this context. Other factors
may include: (a) commercial costs of the software purchase and development
to the plaintiff product manufacturer in developing a mixed good, particularly
software costs as a proportion of the overall cost of designing and
manufacturing the physical product in question; (b) time and effort taken to
develop relevant software incorporated into a physical good; (c) commercial
viability of selling the relevant good without the incorporation of the software;
and (d) efforts taken to register relevant software code at the Copyright Office.
Although none of these factors alone likely will be decisive on the question of
rebutting the presumption against DMCA liability, together they might be
balanced to support or rebut such a presumption in any given case.
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When the presumption against DMCA liability is not rebutted, the
complainant may have actions for infringement under other laws, such as
inducement of breach of contract in situations where a competitor induces
customers to breach their initial contracts with the complainant by buying
unauthorized interoperable products. Alternatively, it may be that there is no
legal action because, as a matter of policy under commercial and competition
law principles, the competitor's conduct is unobjectionable. There is a strong
argument that consumers should have freedom of choice when buying such
goods and should not be locked into restrictive arrangements with the original
manufacturer for after-market parts and service.' 81
Clearly, if the product at the heart of a dispute is actually a copyright work
that happens to be contained within a physical storage medium such as a floppy
disc, CD-ROM, or DVD, the presumption against DMCA liability would not
be triggered. Thus, in cases involving the circumvention of access and control
measures to make unauthorized uses of copyright works, such as video games,
digital movies, and digital music files, the DMCA would apply as usual,
82
subject to any future exemptions adopted by the Librarian of Congress' and
Congress.
In summary, the basic argument here is to advocate a presumption against
DMCA liability (a) where the copyright work in question is merely incidental to
a product manufactured by the complainant and (b) where a technological
encryption measure has been circumvented for the purpose of creating an
interoperable physical product. The presumption would place the evidentiary
burden on the plaintiff to establish the central importance of the copyright work
as such to its claims against the defendant. If the plaintiff was able to discharge
the burden would shift to the defendant to raise any applicable
this burden,
83
defenses.1

181. See Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043
(N.D. Ill. 2003) (recognizing that the AJ found that Chamberlain's consumers do reasonably
expect to be able to access their garage doors with either a Chamberlain or Skylink transmitter).
There appears to have been some concern with this issue in the Chamberlaincase. Consumers
have a reasonable expectation that they can replace an original garage door opener transmitter or
television remote control at some point due to damage or loss without violating federal law.
182. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(B)-(a)(1)(D) (2000) (listing the existing provisions of
the DMCA that allow the Librarian of Congress to make determinations to exempt certain
conduct from anti-circumvention prohibitions).
183. As noted above, the operation and scope of defenses to DMCA claims is still
uncertain. This is another area where legislative revisions ultimately may be necessary,
particularly in terms of clarifying the scope of the fair use defense as contemplated in 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(c)(1), and of determining the boundaries of the other more specific exemptions to
DMCA liability set out in 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
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Courts would be entitled to consider a number of factors when deciding
whether or not the plaintiff had adequately rebutted the presumption against
DMCA liability, such as those factors set out above. Although a multifactor
judicial test can be unpredictable, judges who decide copyright cases are no
strangers to such tests. These kinds of balancing exercises seem to go with the
territory of the copyright landscape. One of the most often applied judicial
multifactor tests is, in fact, the well-known fair use defense to copyright
infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 107 with its flexible "fair use factors."
Additionally, even in the absence of the test suggested here, the judges in the
Lexmark appeal, for example, seemed relatively comfortable in acknowledging
that the protection of Lexmark's software against digital piracy was not its
central concern in the dispute. 184 The problem was that the judges did not have
a clear legislative provision to refer to on this point. Amendments to the
DMCA along the lines suggested here would likely make this task easier for
judges because there would be a clear legislative intention within the statute
itself supporting a determination against DMCA liability in such cases.
2. Mixed Goods and the Presumption Against DMCA Liability
This Article advocates a presumption against DMCA liability rather than a
blanket exemption in the context of interoperable physical products because
there may be some circumstances where the manufacturer of physical goods
that incorporates copyrightable software might have a reasonable claim for
DMCA liability on top of potential liability for copyright infringement. 185 As
noted above, products increasingly are becoming "mixed" in terms of physical
and "informational" components. This will make it more difficult to draw lines
between physical goods and information goods in terms of legal regulation.
While it is important not to confuse the laws and policies relating to these
two types of assets, it is also important to realize that there are some
circumstances where both the physical and informational components of an
item will be commercially valuable to the manufacturer. If the manufacturer
has invested time and resources into both aspects of a product, the physical and
informational components both may be worthy of legal protection under the
relevant legal rules. Thus, in situations of a truly mixed product, when both the
184. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc, 387 F.3d 522, 537 (6th Cir.
2004) (stating the scope of the dispute between the two parties).
185. I take up questions concerning general copyright infringement liability in situations
where the presumption against DMCA liability would apply in the following Part. Infra Part

IV.
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physical aspects and the informational component require legal protection, the
presumption against DMCA liability should be rebuttable. Even Judge Merritt
in the Lexmark appeal, who took the most restrictive view of the plaintiffs
position, felt that the situation only merited a burden shifting so that the
plaintiff must prove a "purpose to pirate on the part of the defendants."186 He
did not feel that future plaintiffs should be excluded absolutely from bringing
DMCA actions in such cases.
A useful part of the test as to when the presumption against DMCA
liability would be rebuttable would be when there is some evidence of the
independent commercial value of the copyrighted software incorporated into
the physical product. The fact of registration of the software may provide some
evidence of the perceived value of the software, at least to the party that
registered the software. However, the fact of registration alone may not be
conclusive on this issue. Indeed, the majority of the Lexmark appeals court, as
well as both Chamberlain courts, did not find registration decisive on even
basic copyrightability issues with respect to some of the disputed software in
each case.187
If the approach suggested here is adopted, a question arises as to whether
DMCA liability in "mixed goods" cases is superfluous when the copyrightable
software incorporated into the product is valuable in its own right and can be
protected through traditional copyright law. In other words, if protection of
copyrighted software code is a central commercial concern of the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff has an available action for copyright infringement, why is DMCA
liability ever necessary in a "mixed goods" scenario?
It may be that there are very few cases of this kind where DMCA liability
is ever truly necessary. That being the case, one could argue that a blanket
prohibition on DMCA liability in the "interoperable products" case is more
appropriate than a rebuttable presumption against DMCA liability. However,
given the aims of the DMCA to protect copyright holders against digital piracy
where traditional copyright law proves inadequate, it is arguable that there may
be some interoperable products cases where the copyrighted software is so
central to the operation of the product in question that the software itself merits
additional DMCA protection. DMCA liability may be necessary, for example,
if the actual copyright infringer(s) cannot be found or cannot be made subject to
a relevant court's jurisdiction. In such cases, it may be appropriate to proceed
186. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring).
187. See id. at 534 (acknowledging that both parties agree that registration with the
copyright office is a prerequisite and provides prima facie evidence that the defendant may
rebut); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043-44 (N.D.
I11.2003) (discussing the role and impact of copyright with respect to the DMCA).
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against a trafficker in a circumvention device. The same reasoning would apply
here as for traditional digital copyright products, such as digital movies, music,
and video games. If digital copyrights are commercially significant to a rightholder and cannot be protected effectively by traditional copyright laws, some
DMCA liability should be available.
We should also bear in mind that as computer technology is incorporated
increasingly into physical goods, the lines between an "information good" and a
tangible good become very blurred. In the future, it may become easier to rebut
the presumption against DMCA liability. What needs to happen now is for
courts and legislatures to start thinking about how best to ascertain the true
subject matter of any given transaction or dispute in terms of whether the issue
truly can be characterized as an intellectual property matter, or whether the
protection of intellectual property is purely incidental to the actual subject
matter at hand. This will help ensure that future laws appropriately are tailored
to the actual commercial concerns of the parties and work to preserve and
support the realistic expectations of consumers about goods they have
purchased.
IV. Copyright Defenses and the DMCA
A. Interoperabilityand CopyrightInfringement
The preceding discussion raised some questions about the relationship
between general copyright liability and specific DMCA liability in the
"interoperable products" area. It advocated a presumption against DMCA
liability in cases where copyrighted software is not a central commercial
component of the product in question. This Part considers the broader question
of whether a similar presumption also should apply to general copyright
infringement liability. In other words, should we advocate a presumption
against any copyright liability in mixed goods cases that can be rebutted only
when the plaintiff can establish the independent commercial significance of the
copyrighted software? Is there any reason for suggesting an exemption to the
DMCA for interoperable physical products that would not also apply to general
copyright infringement liability?
These are difficult questions, particularly given the current uncertainties
about the precise relationship between the DMCA and general copyright
liability. If the view of the court of appeals in Chamberlainis adopted, and
DMCA liability is confined to situations involving protection of copyrights
where those protections do not encroach on competing rights in a copyright
work such as fair use, there may be little reason to ever allow copyright liability
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in a case that also would not attract DMCA liability.' 88 In other words, if the
plaintiff is attempting to protect its copyright in software incorporated into an
interoperable product, it should have the full protection of copyright and
DMCA liability. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff is trying to manipulate
circumstances to utilize copyright principles unconscionably to stifle
competition in a case where the protection of copyrighted software is not its
true objective, then it should have neither DMCA nor copyright protection.
However, the Chamberlain appellate court's interpretation of the
DMCA and its relationship to traditional copyright interests does not
necessarily reflect the actual drafting of the DMCA, nor does it represent past
judicial interpretations of the DMCA. Congress and the judiciary generally
have not required any express demonstration of a clear link between a
copyright infringement action and a circumvention device to ground a
DMCA claim. This has meant that, despite the wording of 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (c)(1), 8 9 fair use has not, for example, been upheld as a defense to the
anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA.' 9° Therefore, it currently cannot
unequivocally be asserted, as the Chamberlainappeals court would suggest,
that copyright and DMCA liability truly are two sides of the same coin. As
noted above, the Lexmark appeal adds no particular weight to the
Chamberlain view on this question, particularly as the fair use issues
discussed in Lexmark are only dicta.
Given the fact that DMCA liability can, and often does, appear to be
more potentially draconian in its application, at least with respect to available
defenses, than traditional copyright liability, there might be a valid argument
for maintaining some possible copyright liability as a "lesser of two evils" in
188. This view was shared by the judges in the Lexmark appeal, although they did not state
the issue as clearly as the court of appeals in Chamberlain. Judge Feikens, however, in his
partial dissent in Lexmark, did make the point that the plaintiff could not succeed on a DMCA
claim if the defendants could successfully raise a fair use defense to the general copyright
infringement claim. This is because there would be no "right of the copyright owner" left to
protect under the DMCA. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 562 (Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). The majority in Lexmark took the view that the PEP was copyrighted code that was not
adequately protected by any technological protection measure, so there was no need to link
DMCA liability with copyright liability because there was no liability for copyright
infringement with respect to the PEP code. The only copying was with respect to the TLP and
the majority felt that this code was not copyrightable. Id. at 548-50.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000). This section provides that "[niothing in this section
shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair
use, under this title." Id.
190. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323-24
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that the "fair use" provisions of the copyright act cannot be used as a
defense to an infringement of the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions as
this was not the legislative intent of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)), affd, 273 F. 3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).

530
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some interoperable physical products cases even if DMCA liability is to be
removed, or strongly presumed not to apply. Software components can have
an independent value outside of a particular physical product into which they
may be incorporated. Software modules often are reused in different
contexts, 91 so the one software module might have a clear stand alone market
value as a result of its ability to be incorporated into a variety of different
products and systems. This value might be protected by copyright law, but
not necessarily by the DMCA in cases that are not about digital piracy
because digital copyright piracy is not a central commercial concern of the
plaintiff in the case in question.
As suggested above, there are currently more well-established defenses
to copyright infringement than to DMCA liability. 92 Thus, the availability of
a general copyright infringement action in a case where copyrightable code is
incorporated into a tangible good only incidentally is perhaps less
objectionable than DMCA liability as a matter of policy because copyright
liability is better tempered by competing legal rights and defenses than
DMCA liability, at least at the present time. If DMCA liability can be
clarified in the ways suggested by the court of appeals in Chamberlain,
perhaps it is less problematic to assume that DMCA liability and general
copyright liability should subsist together in all relevant cases.
However, because the current reach of the DMCA is potentially so
broad, there may be situations involving interoperable physical products
where the presumption against DMCA liability should stand despite the
continued availability to the plaintiff of a general copyright infringement suit.
This is not to say that copyright liability should be generally available in
cases that are not truly about copyright infringement. However, in borderline
cases, perhaps there is an argument for giving more leeway to a plaintiff to
argue copyright infringement than DMCA infringement, given the likelihood
that a copyright infringement action creates a somewhat more level playing
field in terms of available defenses than a DMCA infringement action.

191. Barry D. Bowen, Software Reuse with Java Technology: Finding the Holy Grail,at
http://java.sun.comfeatures/1997/may/reuse.htn-l (1997) (discussing the attainment of reusable
software with Java Technology) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Kimberley
Jordan, Software Reuse Term Paperfor the MJY Team Software Risk ManagementWWW Site,
at http://www.baz.com/kjordan/swse625/htm/tp-kj.htm (Apr. 21, 1997) (discussing the
advantages of creating and developing reusable software) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
192. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (suggesting that there are more defenses
available for copyright infringement claims than for DMCA claims).
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B. FairUse
Notwithstanding the appellate court's decision in Chamberlain,a common
general criticism of the DMCA is that it does not include sufficient protections
for standard copyright defenses such as fair use. 193 Despite Congress's stated
intention in Section 1201(c)(1) of the DMCA not to "affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under [the
copyright act]," it is arguable that fair use in particular has been affected
adversely by the DMCA.194
The accepted judicial interpretation of the DMCA in relation to fair use
has been that although the DMCA does not affect the availability of the fair use
defense to a copyright infringement action, there is no separate "fair use"
defense to a claim for infringement of the DMCA. 95 Also, no current
provision of the DMCA expressly allows circumvention of a technological
protection measure, or trafficking in a circumvention device, to enable access to
a work for fair use purposes, 196 although the DMCA does not prohibit the

circumvention of a copy-control measure expressly, as compared with
trafficking in a device that can circumvent a copy-control measure. 197 It has
193. See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22 (recognizing that Congress deliberately
chose not to make fair use a defense under § 120 1(a) of the DCMA); Benkler, supra note 39, at
414-29 (criticizing the DMCA); Burk, supra note 7, at 1137-38 (stating that "[tIhe limited
exceptions provided under the statute, or under the rulemaking authority of the Librarian of
Congress, lack the breadth and flexibility to fill the equitable role played by fair use").
194. See Burk, supra note 7, at 1137-38 (discussing the impact of the DMCA on the fair
use doctrine).
195. See id. (noting that "the concern here is the availability of fair use or a similar doctrine
to prevent the anti-circumvention right itself from being leveraged into control of adjacent
technologies"); see also Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (discussing the unavailability of the
fair use defense under the DCMA).
196. See Burk, supra note 7, at 1137-38 (recognizing that there is currently no statutory
DMCA provision to prevent circumvention). This is despite the fact that Congress's stated
intention in enacting the DMCA was not to affect defenses like fair use. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1)
(2000).
197. Though § 1201 (a)(1) prohibits circumvention of a technological measure that prevents
unauthorized access to a copyright work, there is no equivalent provision in § 1201(b) that deals
with copy control measures. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), (b) (2000). The intention behind this
drafting was to preserve fair use rights, although this has not been particularly effective in
practice, partly because of the increasing merger of access and copy control measures at the
technological level. See Reese, supra note 25, at 621 (noting that "courts have treated such
Imerged' control measures as entitled to the legal protections of both access-and rightscontrol measures"). Further, consumers often do not have the technological sophistication to
circumvent a copy control measure without being involved in illegal trafficking conduct
involving a circumvention device. See Samuelson, supra note 29, at 548-54 (providing
examples of the relationship between trafficking in circumvention devices and circumvention
conduct per se in cases where the circumventor does not necessarily have the technological

62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2005)
been suggested that fair use should be preserved under the DMCA more clearly
and effectively than is currently the case, 98 particularly in the face of the
increasing 99merger between technological access control and copy-control
measures. 1

However, as the legislation currently stands, the fair use defense clearly
can be raised in a copyright infringement action, but cannot generally be raised
as a defense against DMCA liability for unauthorized circumvention or
trafficking in a circumvention device, even, in many cases, where the resulting
use of a copyright work could be excused as a fair use.200 This is an example of
where the DMCA arguably overreaches in general and certainly overreaches in
the kinds of cases under consideration in this Article.
The tide may now be turning, at least in the area of judicial interpretation
of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1). At several points in the Chamberlainappeal, the
court of appeals noted that Section 1201 (c)(1) should not be contradicted by an
overbroad reading of the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of
the DMCA.2 °' Judge Feikens, in his partial dissent in Lexmark, made similar
suggestions.2 °2 However, neither court directly took issue with previous
judicial determinations that had barred a fair use defense to an anticircumvention or anti-trafficking infringement proceeding.20 3 In fact, on a
means to create a circumvention device in order to make a fair use of a protected work).
198. See Samuelson, supra note 29, at 557 (arguing that the antidevice provisions of the
DMCA should be amended to preserve the ability to manufacture circumvention devices for
legitimate uses, including fair use).
199. See Reese, supra note 25, at 640-47 (discussing the rise of merging access controls
with rights control); see also Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th
Cong., § 5(b) (proposing to allow circumvention of a technological protection measure if it does
not result in a copyright infringement); Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net
Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong., § 5 (proposing to
allow circumvention and/or trafficking in a circumvention device for purposes of making a
noninfringing use of a copyright work in certain circumstances).
200. See Burk, supranote 7, at 1137-38 (discussing the inability of the fair use doctrine to
play the limiting role against DMCA liability).
201. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. SkylinkTechs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1200 (6th Cir. 2004).
202. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 562 (6th Cir.
2004) (Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
203. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,458 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally required, although some isolated
statements in its opinions might arguably be enlisted for such a requirement."); see also United
States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1134-35 (N.D. Cal. 2002). The Elcom court
explained:
[T]he DMCA does not eliminate fair use or substantially impair the fair use rights
of anyone. Congress has not banned or eliminated fair use and nothing in the
DMCA prevents anyone from quoting from a work or comparing texts for the
purpose of study or criticism. The fair user may find it more difficult to engage in
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related issue, the Chamberlain court distinguished the previous cases
interpreting the DMCA in a more restrictive manner that would not protect fair
use as a defense to a DMCA infringement action.2
In a case where a valuable copyright work is truly the subject of a
particular dispute, there may be an argument for a broad prohibition on
circumvention of a technological protection measure if such potential
overreaching is an unavoidable by-product of effectively preventing digital
piracy. However, in a case where the protection of the copyright work is not
the true concern of the complainant, and where the suit is being used as the
basis for hindering undesired commercial competition in an after-market for a
physical product, there is a good argument that DMCA liability should not be
available automatically to the complainant. Otherwise, cases may arise where a
defendant has a fair use defense to a copyright infringement claim but is
nevertheless subject to potential DMCA liability. This is already a problem in
the "true" copyright area, but it is even more worrying in cases where the
plaintiffs real commercial concerns do not revolve around copyright
protection.
A good example would be a mixed goods case where a plaintiff was able
to establish the central commercial concern with copyrighted code, but where
the competitor was able to establish a fair use defense to a copyright
infringement claim. If the plaintiff has no cause of action under copyright law,
she should not have an alternate action under the DMCA in such cases. This is
precisely what Judge Feikens suggests in the Lexmark appeal:
[I]f the district court on remand were to find that the merger, scenes Afaire,
or fair use doctrine supplied an adequate defense to infringement, given the
copying that went on in this case, I do not believe Plaintiff could meet its
burden to show likelihood of success under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b), because
there would 2be
no "right of a copyright owner" to prevent the TLP's use in
05
this fashion.

The problem is that this is not what the DMCA currently says, and it is not how
other courts have decided questions relating to the impact of the fair use
defense to copyright infringement or the operation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1).

certain fair uses with regard to electronic books, but nevertheless, fair use is still
available.
Id.; see also 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1101
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that fair use is not a constitutionally guaranteed right, and in any
event, fair use is not a defense to a DMCA infringement claim).
204. See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1198-99.
205. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 562 (Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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Consider, for example, a printer toner cartridge manufacturer with
copyrighted software code such as the TLP code copyrighted by Lexmark,
subject to technological encryption measures to prevent the unauthorized
operation of a competitor's toner cartridge in the original manufacturer's
printers. Assume further that the TLP code validly was copyrighted either
because it was more complex than the code under consideration in Lexmark or
because a future court did not accept the Lexmark appellate court's conclusions
on the likely copyrightability of such code. 2°
Where the competitor managed to create an interoperable product through
reverse engineering and the interoperable product did not incorporate a copy of
the complainant's software, but rather incorporated new software that was
functionally equivalent, there may be no copyright infringement claim. This is
because certain reverse engineering techniques are considered fair uses under
copyright law.2 °7
In a case such as this where the fair use defense was available to the
defendant under general principles of copyright law, and where the copyright
claim appears somewhat incidental to the complainant's overriding commercial
concerns as a matter of practice, it would be inappropriate for the DMCA to
come into play. However, under the law as it currently stands, even where a
defendant in this kind of interoperable goods case has a fair use defense under
20 8
copyright law, he may arguably have no effective defense to a DMCA claim.
As noted above, the standard fair use defense does not necessarily excuse acts
206. This would certainly be a possibility in practice. As noted above, the majority of the
Lexmark appellate court acknowledged that it was applying a preliminary injunction standard of
review to the issue of the copyrightability of the TLP and that the district court on remand may
decide the copyrightability issue differently at the permanent injunction stage. Lexmark, 387
F.3d 522, 541 (6th Cir. 2004). Additionally, Judge Feikens in his partial dissent did not agree
with the majority's reasoning on the noncopyrightability of the TLP code. See id. at 554
(Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[Tihe record could support a finding that
there was enough original expression in the TLP to qualify it for copyright protection.").
207. See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that disassembling a computer program to produce a compatible noninfringing program
is fair use under copyright law even if it involves incidental copying of the software code); see
also LEAFFER, supra note 45, at 450-52 (analyzing circumstances in which copying a copyright
work in the course of reverse engineering might be excused as a fair use under general
principles of copyright law).
208. This example assumes that a DMCA claim would lie with respect to the software in
the printer toner cartridge, a proposition that was rejected in the Lexmark appellate court.
However, the rejection appeared to be at least partially based on the perceived
noncopyrightability of the toner loading program in that case. The court does not consider
whether the TLP software could have been regarded as a copyright work protected by a
technological protection measure because the majority did not think it was a copyrightable
work. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-38 (6th Cir.
2004).
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of circumvention or trafficking in a circumvention device under the
DMCA. 2 09 Although the comments in the Chamberlainappeal in particular
are helpful here, the judicial record is not decisive in this context for the
reasons set out above. The DMCA as currently drafted contains no
provision to clarify either that the protection of a copyright work must be a
central commercial concern of the plaintiff to support a DMCA claim or
that fair use is a defense to a complaint about unauthorised access to a
copyright work.
There is a specific reverse engineering exception to the operation of
the DMCA. 210 However, it may not apply to situations such as these. The
reverse engineering exception set out in Section 1201(f) of the DMCA only
applies to reverse engineering that results in interoperability of an
independently created computer program with other programs. In this
context, interoperability is defined (somewhat unhelpfully) as "the ability
of computer programs to exchange information, and of such programs
mutually to use the information which has been exchanged., 21 1 Although
the appellate courts in both Lexmark and Chamberlainhave suggested that
this defense would apply to interoperable products cases such as those
under discussion here, the courts' comments in both cases are technically
dicta for the reasons set out above. It is therefore possible that a future
court will take a more restrictive interpretation of the defense. For
example, a court could take the view in an interoperable physical products
case that the defendant has created a program that enables a physical
product to be interoperable with another physical product, rather than with
other programs as contemplated by the legislation.1 2
Even if the interoperability defense is applied in the way suggested by
the appellate courts in Lexmark and Chamberlain,the burden is still placed
on the defendant to raise a second interoperability defense after having
successfully argued fair use in the face of the general copyright
infringement claim. If the defendant's use of a copyright work is a fair use,
it arguably should not be open to the plaintiff to place the additional burden
209. See Burk, supra note 7, at 1137-38 (recognizing that fair use is only available in the
underlying work ifthe work can be accessed without infringing the DMCA).
210. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (2000).
211. Id.§ 1201(0(4).
212. Burk, supra note 7, at 1139 (suggesting that the § 1201(f) exemption to anticircumvention liability only applies to the creation of interoperable software and does not
extend to reverse engineering hardware or data; presumably, this implies that the exemption will
not save reverse engineering undertaken for the purpose of creating an interoperable tangible
good that incidentally incorporates the software in question).
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on the defendant to raise a separate defense to a DMCA claim. It may be
that the defendant is not put to a significant additional burden in raising
this separate defense, given that the fair use defense in such a situation
would likely be based on reverse engineering for interoperability purposes.
Presumably, the fair use defense to the copyright infringement claim would
require proof of similar factual circumstances of the interoperability
defense to the DMCA claim. However, if the two defenses require
evidence of substantially similar, if not precisely the same, facts, it does not
make much sense to maintain two different defenses. Surely, the fair use
defense simply could cover both the copyright infringement and the DMCA
infringement claims.
Perhaps amending the DMCA to incorporate a more general fair use
exemption is the answer here. Some moves are currently underway to
incorporate such an exemption into the DMCA. Both the Benefits Authors
without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2003213 and the Digital Media Consumers' Rights
Act, 214 if enacted, would allow circumvention and trafficking in a
circumvention device where the resulting circumvention was excused by
the fair use defense, among other things.21 5
However, it may be more effective for interoperable products cases to
suggest that when the copyright works in question are merely incidental to
a physical product that is the subject of a dispute, there should be a
presumption against the application of the DMCA's anti-circumvention and
anti-trafficking provisions as suggested above. Unless there is a clear
policy in commercial law that unauthorized interoperable physical products
should not be marketed in competition with an original product
manufacturer, copyright law should not create such a prohibition
incidentally. In fact, there may be good arguments that copyright law per
se should not apply in such situations. However, as discussed above, even
where copyright liability is preserved there may be good reasons to remove
DMCA liability, at least by way of a rebuttable presumption.21 6
213. Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong.
214. Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th Cong.
215. See Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2003, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. § 5 (allowing circumvention and/or
trafficking in a circumvention device for purposes of making a noninfringing use of a copyright
work in certain circumstances); Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2003, H.R. 107, 108th
Cong. § 5(b) (allowing circumvention of a technological protection measure if it does not result
in a copyright infringement).
216. See supra Part III.C.2 (suggesting a rebuttable presumption against DMCA liability).
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C. The FirstSale Doctrine
The first sale doctrine in copyright law provides that copyright holders are
limited in the extent to which they can control after-market uses of a copyright
work after the first sale of the work.217 Thus, the holder of a copyright in a
book may derive royalties from the first sale of the work. However, once a
copy of a book has been purchased, there is no restriction on the owner's ability
to sell that copy in a second-hand market without having to provide royalties to
the copyright owner.
In the past, some copyright holders have attempted to utilize the first sale
doctrine to restrict after-market uses of tangible goods incorporating a copyright
work. In Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L'Anza Research International,
Inc. ,28 the Supreme Court held that the copyright act did not prohibit the
distribution in the United States of bottles of hair care products with
copyrighted labels affixed to them without the authorization of the original
manufacturer and holder of the relevant copyright. Under the first sale
doctrine, a lawful owner of the hair care products has the right to resell them
with the copyrighted labels affixed.219
This was a gray market case in which the manufacturer of the hair care
products sold them within the United States at higher prices than they were sold
outside the United States. Some of the products from the foreign market made
their way back into the United States and were offered for sale at a lower price
than the products intended for the American market. 220 The manufacturer,
L'Anza, argued that the sale of these products within the United States was
prohibited as an infringement of its distribution right in the copyrighted
labels. 22 ' However, the Court held that such an action was not available to
L'Anza because of the application of the first sale doctrine.222 L'Anza had no
217. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (providing that a lawful owner ofacopy ofacopyright
work is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of the relevant copy); LEAFFER, supra note 45, at 310-12 (analyzing the first sale

doctrine in American copyright law).
218. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
219. But note that this result seems to be limited to goods or copyright works originally
produced in the United States because such goods are "lawfully made under U.S. law."
LEAFFER, supra note 45, at 317; see also CBS, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 47, 48-50 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that phonorecords manufactured and distributed in
the Philippines under license from an American copyright holder were not subject to the first
sale defense when imported into the United States because they were not made lawfully under
U.S. law), affd, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
220. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 139.
221. Id. at 145 n.14.
222. Id. at 145.
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control over the distribution of the copyrighted labels after their initial sale to
the foreign distributor.2 23
In the digital copyright world, copyright holders have generally sidestepped the application of the first sale doctrine by resorting to licensing
transactions, rather than sales, for digital copyright works such as computer
software. The software industry also successfully lobbied for amendments to
the copyright act to ensure that no unauthorized uses were made of copies of
computer programs for commercial purposes.224 Thus, the first sale doctrine
has limited applicability in the area of general copyright liability for digital
works as a practical matter.
However, in the case of physical goods that only incidentally incorporate
digital copyrightable material, there might be a good argument that the first sale
doctrine will apply, particularly if there is no clear licensing arrangement in
place with respect to the relevant software. An argument might be made that
these situations more closely parallel the L'Anza situation than the standard
software licensing scenario. L'Anza suggests that the first sale doctrine will not
restrict certain after-market sales of physical goods that happen to incorporate a
copyright work. Presumably, there is no good reason why this principle should
not apply when the copyright work incorporated into the physical product is a
software product rather than a copyrighted artistic work, such as a label on a
shampoo bottle.
For example, if a printer toner cartridge manufacturer provides cartridges
to consumers subject to an agreement that the consumers will return the
cartridges to the manufacturer for remanufacturing, presumably this agreement
is nevertheless a standard sale or lease contract, the subject matter of which is a
tangible good-the cartridge. In common commercial practice, it is unlikely
that the manufacturer and its consumers have entered into a specific licensing
arrangement for any software code that happens to be incidentally incorporated
into the cartridges. If the consumers make unauthorized uses of the cartridges
after purchase, this is presumably a matter for commercial law and not for
copyright law. 225 This situation seems analogous to L'Anza and distinct from a

223. Id.
224. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000); LEAFFER, supra note 45, at 313-14.
225. Of course, this was not the conduct targeted by Lexmark in Lexmark International,
Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943,947 (E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated by
387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). Lexmark was concerned with copying of its copyrighted code by
SCC and with SCC's marketing of a competing product incorporating the copied code. Id.
Lexmark did not bring specific actions against its consumers for breach of contract, although
presumably nothing prevented Lexmark from doing so other than the difficulties and costs
associated with such proceedings. Id. at 946.
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situation where the subject matter of the transaction is computer software, such
as a software license for a computer operating system.
Arguably, it should make very little difference whether the tangible good
is sold outright or leased to the consumer. The point is that there is no separate
licensing agreement covering any software that may be incorporated into the
good. If the main contract is a sale contract, the L'Anza reasoning, at least on
the first sale doctrine, presumably would apply. However, even when the main
contract is a lease of tangible goods, if there is no specific contractual
arrangement involving the software, and the software is not a central
commercial concern of the parties in terms of the subject matter of the bargain,
this would appear to be an unsuitable area for DMCA liability, let alone
copyright liability. Even when there is a specific contractual arrangement
involving the software, as indeed there might be in many cases in the wake of
the Lexmark appeal, it is an open question whether copyright or DMCA
liability should attach when protection of the copyrighted software per se is not
the central commercial focus of the plaintiff.
Obviously, the L'Anza case is distinguishable from Lexmark and
Chamberlainbecause L'Anza did not involve any actual unauthorized copying
of the copyright works affixed to the shampoo bottles.226 However, the
Supreme Court's decision does suggest a judicial concern that the copyright act
should not be extended into commercial contexts for which it was not
designed. 227 The commercial contexts in both situations are somewhat similar
even if the conduct in question is not on par. In the L'Anza case, the context
was the regulation of gray markets in physical goods, and in Lexmark and
Chamberlain, the context is domestic after-markets for physical goods.
However, both cases involve the regulation of some aspect of an after-market
for tangible goods that happen to incorporate a copyright work, so in this sense,
lessons may be learned from L'Anza that are useful in the "interoperable
products" cases.
The idea that copyright law in general should not be used to confuse trade
law policy when the interference is not warranted by the need to protect a
copyright work against piracy is instructive here. It provides further support for
a presumption against DMCA liability in interoperable products cases. The
226. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 140
(1998) (noting that this is an unusual copyright case because L'Anza has not claimed that
anyone has made unauthorized copies of its copyrighted labels).
227. See id. at 153-54 (suggesting that policy concerns about regulation of gray markets
are not the job of the court in interpreting the provisions of the copyright act and noting that
international agreements regulating cross border trade may be relevant to the conduct in
question but are also not relevant to interpreting the copyright act).
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DMCA should not have a broader operation than copyright law in general,
particularly not in cases that are not fundamentally about copyright protection.
D. Copyright Misuse
It is not yet clear how the DMCA might affect other rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement in the future, outside of
questions about fair use and first sale. Arguably, the copyright misuse doctrine
might apply in copyright infringement actions involving interoperable goods
that incorporate copyrighted software. 228 However, there is, as yet, no clear
legislative or judicial guidance as to whether a copyright misuse claim might
validly be raised as a defense in a DMCA infringement action.
The copyright misuse defense in general copyright law can be raised when
a defendant is able to establish either that the copyright holder violated the
antitrust laws or that the copyright holder illegally extended its monopoly
beyond the scope of the copyright or violated the public policies underlying the
copyright laws. 229 This would appear to be the perfect tool for striking the right
balance in cases involving interoperable physical goods that happen to
incorporate copyrighted software, particularly because it brings relevant
antitrust policies into play in appropriate cases.
However, it is simply not clear if the defense applies and, if so, how it
would apply in post-DMCA cases. Although the appellate court in
Chamberlaintook the view that the DMCA does not create an exemption from
the copyright misuse doctrine,230 it is not clear that this approach would be
binding on subsequent courts. Arguably, this point is only dicta because
copyright misuse by the plaintiff does not appear to have been argued strongly
on the face of the record. The case ultimately was decided on the basis that the
defendant's activities did not facilitate unauthorized uses of the plaintiffs
copyrighted software, and that the plaintiff had failed to establish a critical
nexus between the circumvented access to the copyright work and the
228. Copyright misuse was argued unsuccessfully at the district court level in Lexmark.
See Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 965-66 (discussing the copyright misuse doctrine and why it
does not apply in the case at hand-Lexmark is simply enforcing its rights in its computer
programs and not attempting to extend copyright protection illegally). The defense was not
discussed in any detail in the appeal because of the majority finding that there was no copyright
or DMCA infringement. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
551 (6th Cir. 2004).
229. Lexmark, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
230. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1193 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
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protection of a valid copyright interest. 21 The comments about copyright
misuse were only incidental to the final decision, although hopefully they will
be taken up and followed in subsequent cases.232
In this vein, Professor Dan Burk has suggested the adoption of an "anticircumvention misuse" defense to DMCA infringement proceedings,
paralleling the idea of the copyright misuse defense to traditional copyright
infringement, on the assumption that copyright misuse may not in fact be a
valid defense in a DMCA proceeding.23 3 Professor Burk's suggestion is
broader than the DMCA revisions advocated in this Article specifically for
interoperable products cases. His ideas may, if implemented, cure some of the
broader defects of the DMCA as currently drafted and may have particular
resonance for interoperable products cases.
An anti-circumvention misuse defense is a different but complementary
approach to the suggestion made in this Article for a presumption against
DMCA liability in interoperable physical products cases where copyrighted
software is not a central commercial concern of the plaintiff. Professor Burk' s
suggestion would potentially apply more broadly than just to cases involving
interoperable physical products. It would apply in pure information product
scenarios where a plaintiff was utilizing the DMCA to maintain an unjustified
monopoly in an information product market-for example, by tying one
software product to another software product in contravention of traditional
antitrust principles. However, Professor Burk's suggestion presumably would
also place the burden on the defendant to raise the anti-circumvention or antitrafficking misuse defense in contrast to the suggestion made here of an ab
initio presumption against DMCA liability as a hurdle requirement that the
plaintiff would have to rebut in order to maintain its DMCA claim.
In any event, despite Congress's stated intention in Section 1201 (c)(1) of
the DMCA that the DMCA prohibitions on circumvention and trafficking in
circumvention devices are not intended to "affect rights, remedies, limitations,
or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under [the copyright
act]," 234 it may be that the copyright misuse defense does not apply directly to
231. Id. at 1204.
232. Copyright misuse was not at issue in the Lexmark appeal because, in the absence of
copyright liability and DMCA liability, it did not arise. At first instance, the copyright misuse
doctrine was not debated seriously because Judge Forester took the view that Lexmark was
simply enforcing its rights in its computer programs and not attempting to extend its copyright
protection illegally. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d
943, 965-66 (E.D. Ky. 2003), vacatedby 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
233. Burk, supra note 7, at 1132.
234. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2000).
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infringements of those prohibitions. Like the fair use defense, the copyright
misuse defense may be limited to general copyright infringement, rather than to
specific infringements of the provisions of the DMCA, unless future judicial
determinations on these issues start to follow the view taken recently by the
appellate court in Chamberlain.
There is arguably a general need to clarify the operation of the copyright
misuse defense in relation to the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking
provisions of the DMCA. At the very least, there is a need to create a clear
legislative presumption against DMCA liability for cases involving
interoperable physical goods that only incidentally incorporate a copyright
work, when the copyright work is not central to the transaction or dispute in
question. 235 When the copyright act is becoming overbroad and the copyright
misuse defense is of uncertain application, there should be a presumption
against DMCA liability in situations that only incidentally involve copyright
works in commerce.
Copyright misuse may prove ultimately to be a very valuable tool for
striking an appropriate balance in DMCA claims when the subject matter of the
dispute is a mixed product incorporating some copyrightable software.
However, unless and until the application of the copyright misuse defense to
DMCA claims in general, and to DMCA claims involving mixed products in
particular, can be clarified, legislative amendment of the DMCA may be the
best short-term solution. This amendment would provide some clearer
legislative guidance to courts than is currently the case as to when the
application of a copyright misuse defense might be reasonable in particular
circumstances.
V. Conclusions
This Article has touched on a discrete problem that illuminates some
broader issues. The suggestion made to create a specific presumption against
DMCA liability in interoperable products situations addresses a particular area
of concern that the Electronic Frontier Foundation, in the past, has been
branded as one of the unintended consequences of the overbroad drafting of the
DMCA.23 6 Despite recent judicial decisions that may stem the tide here, at least
235. As noted above, a broader approach to the problem of DMCA liability at least is
found in Professor Burk's idea for a general anti-circumvention misuse defense. See Burk,
supranote 7, at 1132-40 (discussing the need to recognize a new claim of anti-circumvention or
paracopyright misuse).
236. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing various ways in
which the DMCA has been applied contrary to congressional intent).
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until manufacturers start crafting software codes and contractual provisions to
get around the judicial reasoning in Lexmark, the problems with the drafting of
the DMCA remain.
Discussion of this issue raises some more general concerns that courts and
legislatures must address in the longer term. An obvious broader issue that has
resurfaced again and again throughout this Article is that of the application of
standard limitations on copyright infringement to claims that specifically relate
to DMCA infringement. Despite the wording of Section 1201(c)(1) of the
DMCA, the extent to which traditional limitations on copyright-such as fair
use, first sale, copyright misuse, merger, and sc nes Afaire-might apply in
DMCA infringement proceedings is simply not clear. These issues will need to
be clarified, and likely will be clarified by courts if not by legislative
amendment in coming years. It may be that the recent appeals in the
Chamberlain and Lexmark cases are good first steps on the road to really
grappling with the underlying policy problems inherent in the current drafting
of the DMCA in this context.
Lexmark also begins to grapple with the important underlying concern
stemming from questions about the copyrightability of certain types of
software. The majority in Lexmark suggests that Lexmark's TLP code is not
copyrightable for lack of originality. 237 There is also a useful analysis of the
potential application of the merger and scenes Afaire doctrines to comparatively
short software programs with high levels of functionality and low levels of
creativity. 238 These issues, and the disagreements between the majority and
Judge Feikens on these points, have not been addressed in detail in this Article
because they relate more to general copyright infringement actions than specific
DMCA issues.
However, the point was made by judges in both the Lexmark and
Chamberlainappeals that when no copyright action lies in an interoperability
case, there is no relevant copyright for the plaintiff to protect under a DMCA
claim. 239 As noted above, this is not precisely what the DMCA says. There is
no clear requirement of a successful copyright action to support a DMCA
claim. There is only a requirement that the technological encryption measure in

237. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 540-41
(6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the originality requirement necessary for copyright protection).
238. Id. at 535-36.
239. See id. at 551 (concluding that because the TLP was not copyrightable, Lexmark's
direct copyright infringement and DMCA claims failed); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining the grounds for liability created
by the DMCA).
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question effectively protects a copyright work. 24 0 An example of the difference
between the two situations has been addressed in this Article; that is, if
Lexmark had encrypted its admittedly validly copyrighted PEP code effectively,
it may have been able to mount a successful DMCA action despite the fact that
SCC had not copied the PEP code. Arguably, all Lexmark would have had to
establish for a successful DMCA claim would have been the copyrightability of
the PEP code-not a successful copyright infringement action regarding the
PEP code-and that SCC had circumvented a technological protection measure
effectively preventing access to the PEP code.
The question of copyrightability of software per se has been a contentious
issue in many jurisdictions for many years. The potential application of both
copyright infringement actions and potential DMCA claims in the case of
software incorporated into physical products is but one example of copyrighting
software causing unforeseen problems. This is not necessarily an argument for
returning to old debates about whether or not code should ever be
copyrightable. 241 However, it does suggest that software copyrights should be
analyzed with care in practice. The Lexmark appellate court does a good job of
refocusing our attention on the underlying problems with accepting wideranging software copyrights generally in its discussion of the potential
noncopyrightability of the TLP code.242
While these general problems remain with respect to digital copyright law,
it is important that something be done in the interoperable products context in
the short term to ensure that manufacturers of physical products incorporating
copyrighted software do not have the option of utilizing the DMCA in the
manner attempted by Lexmark and Chamberlain. Manufacturers should not be
in a position to avail themselves of DMCA claims where their central concern
is not with digital copyright piracy. At least this should be so when the
240. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), (b)(1) (2000).
241. On the historical question of copyright and patent protection for software code
generally, as compared with the creation of sui generis intellectual property rights for software,
see generally Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protectionfor Computer Software, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1329 (1987) (discussing the market failures resulting from the use of copyright law as the
primary means for protecting intellectual work in computer software); J.H. Reichman, Legal
Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994)
(discussing the problems associated with the proliferation of legal hybrids resulting from
deviations from the traditional bipolar structure of the international intellectual property
system); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protectionof Computer
Programs,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (suggesting foundational concepts upon which a
new legal regime designed to protect computer software could be based).
242. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-39
(6th Cir. 2004) (discussing the legal errors made by the district court in determining that
Lexmark was likely to prevail on its copyright claim).
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manufacturer in question does not have a clear case of copyright infringement. It
should perhaps also be the case in some situations in which a copyright
infringement is arguably present but protecting against digital piracy is not a
central commercial aim of the complainant.
To this end, this Article has advocated an approach to amending the DMCA
that would create a presumption against liability under Sections 1201(a)(1)(A),
1201 (a)(2), and 1201 (b) when the complainant's case revolves around a physical
product that only incidentally incorporates a copyrightable work, and when the
defendant's circumvention or trafficking conduct relates to an attempt to create an
interoperable physical product. The presumption would put the initial burden of
proof on the plaintiff to establish the central commercial relevance of the software
code to its dispute. If the plaintiff rebuts the presumption, the burden would shift
to the defendant to raise applicable defenses to the DMCA claim. 243 Although the
defenses to a DMCA action are still problematic and likely will require further
legislative and judicial development, at least the shifting of the initial burden of
proof to the plaintiff will place less immediate importance on the development of
these defenses in cases that are not really about digital copyright piracy.
Obviously, some of the questions of fact arising under this approach could
be costly and difficult to address. For example, it will not always be an easy task
to establish just how central a copyright work is to the value of a mixed product in
commerce. These decisions will be matters for the courts based on the evidence
presented by the parties. Courts are well qualified to make such decisions based
on available evidence and on the judges' perceptions of relevant social norms.
Even a multiple-factor judicial test such as that advocated in this Article should
not be overly problematic. Judges in the copyright area are very familiar with
multi-factor judicial tests, largely from years of judicial development in the
interpretation of the fair use factors, now set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107.

243. For completeness, it should perhaps be noted here that a legislative amendment rather
than executive action is suggested because the legislature is arguably better placed to establish
presumptions about burdens of proof than the executive. As noted by Judge Merritt in Lexmark,
the other option is to create judicial presumptions about burdens of proof and persuasion in
these cases. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 552-53 (Merritt, J., concurring). However, for the reasons
discussed above, a legislative presumption might be preferable. Given the current drafting of
the DMCA, it is not clear that the judiciary should have the ability to interpret the legislation to
shift burdens of proof in the way suggested by Judge Merritt. In any event, it may take longer to
achieve judicial consensus among the different court circuits than a simple legislative change.
Judge Feikens is quick to point out in Lexmark how the circuit courts have differed as to the
basis of their interpretations of the merger and sc6nes Afaire doctrines in copyright law. Id. at
557-60 (Feikens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). It would seem that the creation of
judicial presumptions about burdens of proof under DMCA claims may well suffer the same
fate.
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In any event, many cases will not involve difficult issues of fact in this
context. It likely will be more or less obvious in most cases whether the parties
are really arguing about commercial competition in a market for physical goods in
which some copyrighted software is purely incidental to the goods in question, or
whether the plaintiff's real concern is with copyright piracy. Judges simply need
to be attuned to the need to draw clear distinctions between commercial law
issues and copyright issues where appropriate. This is not a novel question for
courts. After all, UCITA had asked judges to do the same thing.
This leads to the other broader issue that is raised in this Article, namely, the
extent to which intellectual property laws should ever encroach into matters that
are better characterized as being about trade or commerce in physical products.
As commercial goods become more mixed in characterization due to the
increasing incorporation of digital technology, there will be more of a need to
consider the appropriate role of intellectual property laws in regulating
commercial markets in these goods. Can the incorporation of a copyright work
into a physical good somehow change the basic legal character of the good?
Should it?
Though not specifically addressing that broader question in any detail, this
Article does emphasize the fact that drafters of commercial laws increasingly have
to think about the impact of digital technology and intellectual property law in the
commercial sphere, while drafters of intellectual property laws need to examine
more closely the impact their legislation may have in various commercial
contexts. The current levels and methods of incorporating copyrighted software
into tangible goods may only be the tip of the iceberg. Increasingly, in the future,
legislators, judges, and legal commentators will have to come to grips with the
nature of legal rights in mixed products and concomitant limitations on those
rights.
The boundaries between sales law, licensing law, antitrust law, and
intellectual property law are becoming more and more blurred as the nature of
products in commerce evolves in the digital age. In formulating new legal and
policy approaches to regulating trade in these goods, it is important to keep the
traditional boundaries in mind and, from that basis, to make decisions as to
whether the boundaries need to be re-evaluated. The above discussion assumes
the need to maintain and assert the traditional boundaries between laws regulating
commercial dealings in physical goods and those regulating copyright piracy. If
ultimately those boundaries are to be altered, they should be changed consciously
and with a clear intention to do so, not accidentally as an unforeseen result of a
law intended to combat digital copyright piracy.

